Mechanical Choices

Michael S. Moore is Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair in Law at the University of Illinois and Co-Director of the Program in Law and Philosophy.

• Preface and AcknowledgmentsChapter 1: Introduction Part I: Criminal Law and the Morality of Ascribing ResponsibilityChapter 2: The General Structure of Criminal Law in Terms of Ascriptive Moral PrinciplesPart II: The Criminal Law's Suppositions About the Psychology of PersonsChapter 3: Human Actions at the Root of Moral Wrongdoing and Criminal Law's Actus ReusChapter 4: Intention and Belief at the Root of Moral Culpability and Mens ReaChapter 5: Further Questions About the Basic Distinction Between Intention and Belief Chapter 6: The Royal Road to the Criminal Law's Concept of the Psychology of Persons: The Insanity DefensePart III: The Challenges to Criminal Law by NeuroscienceChapter 7: The Challenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges Mounted From that DataPart IV: The Hard Determinist ChallengeChapter 8: The Libertarian, Fictionalist, and Compatibilist Responses to Hard Determinism Chapter 9: Rescuing the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (The Overshoot Problem for Compatibilism)PART V: The Epiphenomenalist ChallengeChapter 10: The Initiation of the Epiphenomenalist Challenge in the Work of Benjamin LibetChapter 11: The Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with ResponsibilityPART VI: The Reductionist ChallengeChapter 12: "Nothing But a Pack of Neurons" Part VII: Neuroscience as the Helper rather than the Challenger of the Criminal LawChapter 13: The Potential Contributions of Neuroscience to our Understanding of Addiction

Mechanical Choices has much to offer...those interested in the base assumptions of extant criminal law and a detailed compatibilist account of moral responsibility will reap great intellectual dividends by investing their time in Mechanical Choices.