Market Microstructure

• Preface and acknowledgements; Introduction; Part I. Market Microstructure and the Intermediation Theory of the Firm: 1. Market microstructure and intermediation; 2. Price setting and intermediation by firms 3. Competition Part II. Competition and Market Equilibrium: 3. Competition between intermediaries; 4. Intermediation and general equilibrium; Part III. Intermediation Versus Decentralized Trade: 5. Matching and intermediation by firms; 6. Search and intermediation by firms; Part IV. Intermediation under Asymmetric Information: 7. Adverse selection in product markets; 8. Adverse selection in financial markets; Part V. Intermediation and Transaction Costs: 9. Transaction costs and the contractual theory for the firm; 10. Transaction costs and the intermediation theory of the firm; Part VI. Intermediation and Agency: 11. Agency and the organizational-incentive theory of the firm; 12. Agency and the intermediation theory of the firm; Conclusion.

"Market Microstructure provides a rich new theoretical analysis of the role of firms in markets. It argues convincingly that by acting as intermediaries, firms can alleviate the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and high search costs, and can encourage valuable investment. Using elegantly simple models, this book offers deep new insights into why firms emerge and how markets function." Paul Milgrom, Stanford University