Madisonian Constitution

George Thomas is an assistant professor of government at Claremont McKenna College. He previously taught at Williams College.

• PrefaceIntroduction1. Madison's Complex Constitutionalism2. Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Meaning of the Civil War Amendments3. The Progressive Reconstruction of American Constitutionalism4. Discontinuities in the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937"5. Unsettling the New Deal and the Return of OriginalismConclusionNotesIndex

In this ambitious, densely written and thought provoking work, Thomas proposes a perspective on constitutional interpretation that is at once a normative theory of constitutional practice and a redescription of constitutional history informed by that practice. -- Douglas C. Dow Law and Politics Book Review 2009 By departing from traditional perspectives on judicial review, Professor Thomas provides an unconventional, yet refreshing and historically grounded, view of how historical constitutional conflicts have fallen squarely within Madison's vision. Harvard Law Review 2009 Thomas's book paves an important new path for the rest of us in our study of the Constitution and its effect on politics. His account of Madison's principle of constitutional contestation might well be the best account that yet exists of the reigning principle of our founder's political thought. -- Benjamin Kleinerman Review of Politics 2009 In The Madisonian Constitution, Thomas charts a philosophically grounded and historically informed course... showing that James Madison and most others responsible for framing the Constitution, as well as major statesmen who followed, had a more prudent approach in mind. -- Stanley C. Brubaker Law and Society Review 2009 The Madisonian Constitution reminds readers of that moment when, as Justice Story said, the meaning of the fundamental law was something far more important than the mere lawyers' 'extraordinary gloss' it has become. -- Gary L. McDowell Journal of American History 2009 Thomas's Madison points the way to salvation from forms of constitutionalism that either place inordinate power in a small body of elite judges and lawyers, or give up on constitutional government altogether. -- Michael P. Zuckert Claremont Review of Books 2009