Limits of Leviathan

Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law

Häftad, Engelska, 2011

Av Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan, Robert E. (University of Virginia) Scott, III (University of Virginia) Stephan, Paul B.

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Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2011-07-14
Mått152 x 229 x 15 mm
Vikt390 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor264
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9780521367974

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Folkrätt inom Juridik
Internationell rätt inom Juridik

Review of the hardback: 'Professors Scott and Stephan have produced an important and thought-provoking book on the intersection of contract theory and international law. The authors contend that there is too much enforcement of international law by private parties who file complaints before international tribunals and domestic courts armed with the power to sanction nations that fail to live up to their treaty bargains. This is a provocative claim, one that challenges the widely-held views of international lawyers and political scientists that the international legal system is weak and needs to be strengthened. The authors support their theory of optimal enforcement of international agreements with numerous examples ranging across human rights, trade, international criminal law, and intellectual property. And they include specific prescriptions for governments and policymakers. Scholars of international cooperation and treaty design would do well to give The Limits of Leviathan the careful attention that it deserves.' Laurence R. Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School