Del i serien Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile

Häftad, Engelska, 2007

AvJohn B. Londregan

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The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing legislative votes, based upon a detailed empirical analysis of Chile's legislative politics. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile extends existing spatial models of policy preferences by incorporating a valence component to policy choices. The valence component enables an agenda setter, in Chile the democratically elected president, to overcome veto players' objections to reform. Londregan specifically also uses Senate committee voting records to study the impact of human rights concessions on the political debate.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2007-05-17
Mått154 x 229 x 17 mm
Vikt450 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SeriePolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Antal sidor292
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9780521037266

Tillhör följande kategorier

Statsskick och politiska processer inom Samhälle och politik

Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1. Ideology and valence; 2. Accident and force; 3. Legislative institutions in the constitution of 1980; 4. Roll-call votes and senate committees; 5. The Labor committee; 6. The Education committee; 7. The Constitution committee; 8. Legislative politics and Chile's transition toward democracy; Conclusion; Appendix: estimating preferences from voting records; Bibliography; Index.

'Londregan's book poses a powerful question: to what extent does a quasi-democratic constitution crafted by a military government constrain a liberal electorate from enacting laws consistent with their preferences? In answering this question, Londregan combines state-of-the-art methodology with a deep understanding of the Chilean case. The scintillating analysis of legislative politics in the final chapter is proof positive that high-tech statistical methods are a tool, not a barrier, to compelling narrative. I recommend this book to all comparativists.' David Latin, Stanford University