Learning from the Secret Past

Robert Dover is a senior lecturer in international relations at Loughborough University (UK) and the author of The Europeanization of British Defence Policy, 1997-2005. Michael S. Goodman is a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, official historian of the Joint Intelligence Committee (UK), and author of Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb.

• Preface Learning from the Secret PastDavid Omand Part I: The Organization and Oversight of Intelligence1. The Post-War Organization of Intelligence: The January 1945 Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee on "The Intelligence Machine"Michael Herman Document: The Intelligence Machine 2. "A Formidable Power to Cause Trouble for the Government"? Intelligence Oversight and the Creation of the UK Intelligence and Security CommitteePeter Gill Document: Intelligence Services Bill Part II: Political Interference in Intelligence 3. The Scott Report: Intelligence and the Arms TradeRobert Dover Document: Matrix Churchill Ltd: Export Licence Applications for Iraq, September 25, 1989 4. Political Interference in the Intelligence Process: The Case of Iraqi WMDMark Phythian Document: The Butler Report: Annex B: Intelligence Assessment and Presentation: From March to September 2002 Part III: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism5. Intelligence and Counterinsurgency: The Malayan ExperienceMatthew Jones Document: "The Special Branch Charter," Directive No. 21, Director of Operations, Malaya, 24th April 1952 6. "A Skeleton in Our Cupboard": British Interrogation Procedures in Northern IrelandRichard J. Aldrich Document6: Prisoner Handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland: Report by the Intelligence Coordinator 7. The Value and Limits of Experience in the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1969-1972Eunan O'Halpin Document: Visit by Secretary JIC to Northern Ireland, January 10-12, 1972 Part IV: Avoiding Surprise 8. Suez and the Threat to UK Interests OverseasGill Bennett Document: The Threat to United Kingdom Interests Overseas, October 18, 1956 9. Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile CrisisLen Scott Document: "Cuba: Threat Posed By Soviet Missiles," October 26, 1962 Document: CIA Memo: Meeting No. 1 (London) at Mount Royal Hotel, April 20, 1961 10. Avoiding Surprise: The Nicoll Report and Intelligence AnalysisMichael S. Goodman Document: "The Joint Intelligence Committee and Warning of Aggression," November 1981 11. Lessons Learned: What the History of British Intelligence Can Tell Us about the FutureRobert Dover and Michael S. GoodmanContributors Index

The range of documents throughout the volume is impressive, including a parliamentary debate, Joint Intelligence Committee reports, a transcription of a secret meeting between agents and a military directive. By integrating these fascinating sources with perceptive historical analysis, this book makes a strong case for the desirability of studying the past. International Affairs This is a book that any serious student of British intelligence activity will want to read and read again. British Politics Group Newsletter Dover and Goodman have made a substantial and timely contribution to the American and British intelligence communities on aspects of the importance of creating a process to identify lessons learned, similar to the process used by the military, in spite of the difficulty of drawing lessons from intelligence because most successes go unreported due to the nature of the trade, and failures are analyzed by outsiders who must judge what they are not allowed to observe. International Journal of Intelligence Ethics