Kant's Tribunal of Reason

Sofie Møller is a research associate in philosophy at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main.

• Introduction; I.1 The cognitive function of metaphors; I.2 Methodological considerations; I.3 The primacy of practical reason and epistemic normativity; I.4 Outline of the book; 1. The critique as the establishment of reason's lawful condition; 1.1 The critique as a review of laws; 1.2 The natural right tradition and the Naturrecht Feyerabend; 1.3 The critique as a lawful solution to conflicts; 1.4 Establishing a rightful condition; 2. The normativity of law; 2.1 Natural right and positive law; 2.2 Laws of nature in the natural sciences; 2.3 A priori laws as objectively valid rules; 2.4 Laws and principles; 2.5 The understanding as prescribing laws to nature; 3. The transcendental deduction and the tradition of legal deductions; 3.1 Quid juris and the transcendental deduction; 3.2 The analogy between concepts and property; 3.3 The transcendental deduction as a legal deduction tracing an origin; 3.4 The tradition of legal deductions; 4. The question of fact and the question of law in judicial imputation and in the transcendental deduction; 4.1 Quid facti and the tracing of an origin; 4.2 Quid facti and the metaphysical deduction; 4.3 The question of fact and the question of law in judicial imputation; 4.4 The transcendental deduction as judicial imputation; 5. The tribunal of reason; 5.1 The critique as tribunal; 5.2 The Antinomies as a legal trial; 5.3 Empirical experience as testimony; 5.4 The reader as judge of the critique; 5.5 The outcome of the critique as verdict; 6. Moral conscience as the practical inner tribunal; 6.1 Conscience as an inner tribunal; 6.2 Self-deception in moral conscience; 6.3 The problem of an erring conscience; 6.4 Parallels between moral conscience and the critique of pure reason; 7. Distinguishing between rightful claims and groundless pretensions; 7.1 Historical background on judicial authority; 7.2 Kant on judicial authority; 7.3 The judicial office in the legal metaphors; 7.4 Authority and validity of judgments and inferences; 8. Epistemic authority as both individual and collectively shared; 8.1 Decrees as the opposite of verdicts; 8.2 Cognitive attitudes; 8.3 Epistemic authority and the thinking self; 8.4 Political aspects of the critique of pure reason; 8.5 The community of cognisers; 9. Systematicity and philosophy as the legislation of reason; 9.1 Other images of systematicity: the organism and the building; 9.2 The legal metaphors as illustrations of systematicity; 9.3 Philosophy as the legislation of human reason; 9.4 Systematicity in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic; 9.5 The critique as the science of the laws of pure reason; Conclusion.

'The simplest objection to Kant's Critical project – the claim that reason cannot critique itself – is one that Kant himself not only anticipated but largely answered.  Moller shows how Kant's extensive legal metaphors throughout the Critique of Pure Reason form a coherent whole intended to explain the basis of reason's self-critique.  She provides the best explanation yet of how Kant defended his critical project, one that also reveals Kant's deep understanding of natural law theory.' Frederick Rauscher, Michigan State University