Intelligence Community in the War on Terror

Despite the progress of transformation within the U.S. Intelligence Community in the years since 9/11, we are still far from winning the War on Terror. Reforms within the community are the result of both congressional legislation and a threat that has evolved from a conventional military force to an unconventional and unpredictable insurgency. Many argue that some of these reforms have either lost their utility based on the rapidly changing threat, or they were wrong from the start and have only created more challenges for the Intelligence Community to overcome. This report analyzes a number of key reforms at both national and military levels to identify these challenges and determine if the reforms are pointed in the direction necessary to counter the threat as it continues to evolve. In examining reforms affecting national leadership and organizations, as well as operational doctrine and capability, this report concludes a number of organizational, technical, and cultural issues have indeed slowed the progress of intelligence reform. Included in the report are some suggestions for leaders and planners to consider in making any course corrections necessary to retain any advantage we may have achieved since 9/11.