This volume deals with a fundamental problem in political and moral philosophy: why should an otherwise rational agent comply with norms? The book deals with this question in areas as diverse as evolutionary game theory, moral philosophy, action theory, formal decision theory, and social psychology. The author argues that standard rational choice analyses fail to explain several crucial features of norm-guided behaviour. A complete analysis of the reasons rational agents have for compliance with norms has to include an account of specific virtues, such as trust and fairness. In order to accommodate these virtues in the theory of rational choice, Verbeek argues that we need to give up the inherently forward-looking character of instrumentally rational deliberation.
1 Introduction.- 2 Conventionalism and Moral Motives.- 3 Motives for Unconditional Cooperation.- 4 Motives for Conditional Cooperation: reciprocity, trust and fairness.- 5 Virtuous Motives: restraint and spontaneity.- 6 Evolution of the Cooperative Virtues: an indirect justification.- 7 The Rationality of Plans: requirements of dynamic choice.- 8 The Rationality of Strategic Intentions: a justification of the cooperative virtues.- References.