Jeffrey A. Bell is Professor of Philosophy at Southeastern Louisiana University. He has recently been a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor in Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London, during which time much of this book was written. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, including Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), Deleuze’s Hume (Edinburgh University Press, 2008), Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos (University of Toronto Press, 2006) and The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism (University of Toronto Press, 1998). Bell is co-editor with Paul Livingston and Andrew Cutrofello of Beyond the Analytic–Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2015) and with Claire Colebrook of Deleuze and History (Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

• Introduction§1 Problem of the New§2 Problem of Relations§3 Problem of Emergence§4 Problem of One and Many§5 Plato and the Third Man Argument (TMA)Plato’s Theory of FormsVlastos on Third Man ArgumentGail Fine and the Imperfection ArgumentThe New and the Third Man ArgumentThe Imperfection Argument and Degrees of Being/NoveltyProblem of Becoming in PlatoPhilebus and the Method of MixtureRelative and Absolute Relations §6 Bradley and the Problem of RelationsTMA and RegressBradley on RelationsBradley Regress and TMAImperfection Argument and Bradley RegressRelative and Absolute Relations (again)§7 Moore, Russell, and the Birth of Analytic PhilosophyBirth of Analytic PhilosophyMoore on BradleyMoorean Brute Facts and End to RegressRussell on BradleyMoore/Russell on Brute FactsDefending BradleyMichael Della Rocca on the Method of IntuitionDella Rocca’s Spinozist Solution to the Problem of RelationsMethod of Intuition and Analytic Philosophy of TimeMonism or Pluralism?§8 Russell and Deleuze on LeibnizRussell on the Task of Analysis (and on the taste of coffee) Russell on LeibnizDeleuze on LeibnizClear and Distinct/Confused and Obscure; or, on Differential Unconscious§9 On Problematic FieldsPlato, Leibniz, and Problematic FieldsProblematic Fields and Field TheoryBourdieu on FieldsRussell on Externality of Relations to TermsProblematic Fields and Bourdieu’s Fields contrastedAustin and PerformativesWeimar Republic and November 20, 1923Problematic Fields and External CircumstancesOn LearningProblematic Fields and Platonic Ideas§10 Kant and Problematic IdeasKant and PlatoInfinity and AntinomiesReturning to Kant and HumeUnity of ConsciousnessKant, Russell, and the Otherness of the GivenKant, Infinite Regresses, and Infinite TasksPossible Experience and Real ExperienceKant’s Left-Hand ParadoxKant, Plato, and FregeKant and the Problematic Idea§11 D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis on Problem of One and ManyKant’s Transcendental IllusionFrege and the Third Man ArgumentArmstrong on UniversalsLewis on Universals and Natural PropertiesClasses and IndividualsThe Trouble with SingletonsLewis and RegressesNatural Properties and Humean SuperveniencePrimacy of the Determinate Philebus and LewisProblematic Ideas as Non-Mereological Part of Determinate§12 Determinables and DeterminatesProblem of EmergenceJessica Wilson and Fundamental DeterminablesWilson and DeleuzeUexküll’s ticksMetaphysical Indeterminacy and the Primacy of the DeterminateDeterminables and Problematic Ideas§13 The Limits of Representational ThoughtPredicates as Determinates or Determinables?Mark Wilson on PredicatesHasok Chang on Inventing TemperatureMark Wilson on Theory FaçadesHusserl and the ‘constitutive becoming of the world’Husserl and American neo-realism; or, Hook and Nagel invent Analytic PhilosophyHeidegger, Carnap, and the Purification of Everyday Language Husserl’s Humean PhenomenologyHusserl and Regress of ConsciousnessHusserl and Problem of SingletonsHusserl and LebensphilosophieProblematic Ideas and SingletonsDeleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism§14 Learning from a Cup of CoffeeMark Wilson, Temperature, and Theory FaçadesTranscendental Empiricism and Real ExperienceAdorno’s Negative DialecticsAdorno’s non-conceptual objectivityEthnomethodology and the Taste of CoffeeObjectivity and Problematic Ideas§15 Carnap and the Fate of MetaphysicsCarnap’s "Elimination of Metaphysics"Regresses and Logical AnalysisWilfrid Sellars and the Myth of the GivenMcDowell and World-Disclosing ExperienceDreyfus on McDowell; or, on non-conceptual experienceMcDowell replies, and Jason Stanley on SkillMacFarlane on McDowell; or,the Problem of Mathematical ExperienceLewis and Singletons, againMeillassoux, Contingency, and MathematicsHuw Price, Pragmatic Relevance, and the Fate of MetaphysicsMonism or Pluralism?§16 Truth and RelevanceArbitrary Accounts and Infinite RegressesBrute Facts or Spinozist Bullet?Davidson’s Coherence Theory of TruthDavidson on LanguageProblematic Ideas; or, Pluralism = MonismProblematic Ideas and the Relevance of the DeterminateLiving the Problem; or, the inescapable social fieldMeillassoux and the primacy of the determinateTowards a Humean Political TheoryConclusionBibliography

With stunning erudition, interdisciplinary insight, and characteristic boldness, Bell highlights the vicissitudes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Equally at home in the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, as well as in both analytical and continental traditions, this　pluralist manifesto powerfully challenges the one-sided alliance with science that has led to an unfortunate scaling back of philosophy's traditional pursuit　of the questions of relevance and meaning.

Jeffrey A. Bell is Professor of Philosophy at Southeastern Louisiana University. He has recently been a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor in Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London, during which time much of this book was written. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, including Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), Deleuze’s Hume (Edinburgh University Press, 2008), Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos (University of Toronto Press, 2006) and The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism (University of Toronto Press, 1998). Bell is co-editor with Paul Livingston and Andrew Cutrofello of Beyond the Analytic–Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2015) and with Claire Colebrook of Deleuze and History (Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

• Introduction§1 Problem of the New§2 Problem of Relations§3 Problem of Emergence§4 Problem of One and Many§5 Plato and the Third Man Argument (TMA)Plato’s Theory of FormsVlastos on Third Man ArgumentGail Fine and the Imperfection ArgumentThe New and the Third Man ArgumentThe Imperfection Argument and Degrees of Being/NoveltyProblem of Becoming in PlatoPhilebus and the Method of MixtureRelative and Absolute Relations §6 Bradley and the Problem of RelationsTMA and RegressBradley on RelationsBradley Regress and TMAImperfection Argument and Bradley RegressRelative and Absolute Relations (again)§7 Moore, Russell, and the Birth of Analytic PhilosophyBirth of Analytic PhilosophyMoore on BradleyMoorean Brute Facts and End to RegressRussell on BradleyMoore/Russell on Brute FactsDefending BradleyMichael Della Rocca on the Method of IntuitionDella Rocca’s Spinozist Solution to the Problem of RelationsMethod of Intuition and Analytic Philosophy of TimeMonism or Pluralism?§8 Russell and Deleuze on LeibnizRussell on the Task of Analysis (and on the taste of coffee) Russell on LeibnizDeleuze on LeibnizClear and Distinct/Confused and Obscure; or, on Differential Unconscious§9 On Problematic FieldsPlato, Leibniz, and Problematic FieldsProblematic Fields and Field TheoryBourdieu on FieldsRussell on Externality of Relations to TermsProblematic Fields and Bourdieu’s Fields contrastedAustin and PerformativesWeimar Republic and November 20, 1923Problematic Fields and External CircumstancesOn LearningProblematic Fields and Platonic Ideas§10 Kant and Problematic IdeasKant and PlatoInfinity and AntinomiesReturning to Kant and HumeUnity of ConsciousnessKant, Russell, and the Otherness of the GivenKant, Infinite Regresses, and Infinite TasksPossible Experience and Real ExperienceKant’s Left-Hand ParadoxKant, Plato, and FregeKant and the Problematic Idea§11 D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis on Problem of One and ManyKant’s Transcendental IllusionFrege and the Third Man ArgumentArmstrong on UniversalsLewis on Universals and Natural PropertiesClasses and IndividualsThe Trouble with SingletonsLewis and RegressesNatural Properties and Humean SuperveniencePrimacy of the Determinate Philebus and LewisProblematic Ideas as Non-Mereological Part of Determinate§12 Determinables and DeterminatesProblem of EmergenceJessica Wilson and Fundamental DeterminablesWilson and DeleuzeUexküll’s ticksMetaphysical Indeterminacy and the Primacy of the DeterminateDeterminables and Problematic Ideas§13 The Limits of Representational ThoughtPredicates as Determinates or Determinables?Mark Wilson on PredicatesHasok Chang on Inventing TemperatureMark Wilson on Theory FaçadesHusserl and the ‘constitutive becoming of the world’Husserl and American neo-realism; or, Hook and Nagel invent Analytic PhilosophyHeidegger, Carnap, and the Purification of Everyday Language Husserl’s Humean PhenomenologyHusserl and Regress of ConsciousnessHusserl and Problem of SingletonsHusserl and LebensphilosophieProblematic Ideas and SingletonsDeleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism§14 Learning from a Cup of CoffeeMark Wilson, Temperature, and Theory FaçadesTranscendental Empiricism and Real ExperienceAdorno’s Negative DialecticsAdorno’s non-conceptual objectivityEthnomethodology and the Taste of CoffeeObjectivity and Problematic Ideas§15 Carnap and the Fate of MetaphysicsCarnap’s "Elimination of Metaphysics"Regresses and Logical AnalysisWilfrid Sellars and the Myth of the GivenMcDowell and World-Disclosing ExperienceDreyfus on McDowell; or, on non-conceptual experienceMcDowell replies, and Jason Stanley on SkillMacFarlane on McDowell; or,the Problem of Mathematical ExperienceLewis and Singletons, againMeillassoux, Contingency, and MathematicsHuw Price, Pragmatic Relevance, and the Fate of MetaphysicsMonism or Pluralism?§16 Truth and RelevanceArbitrary Accounts and Infinite RegressesBrute Facts or Spinozist Bullet?Davidson’s Coherence Theory of TruthDavidson on LanguageProblematic Ideas; or, Pluralism = MonismProblematic Ideas and the Relevance of the DeterminateLiving the Problem; or, the inescapable social fieldMeillassoux and the primacy of the determinateTowards a Humean Political TheoryConclusionBibliography

With stunning erudition, interdisciplinary insight, and characteristic boldness, Bell highlights the vicissitudes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Equally at home in the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, as well as in both analytical and continental traditions, this　pluralist manifesto powerfully challenges the one-sided alliance with science that has led to an unfortunate scaling back of philosophy's traditional pursuit　of the questions of relevance and meaning.

Jeffrey A. Bell is Professor of Philosophy at Southeastern Louisiana University. He has recently been a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor in Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London, during which time much of this book was written. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, including Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), Deleuze’s Hume (Edinburgh University Press, 2008), Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos (University of Toronto Press, 2006) and The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism (University of Toronto Press, 1998). Bell is co-editor with Paul Livingston and Andrew Cutrofello of Beyond the Analytic–Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2015) and with Claire Colebrook of Deleuze and History (Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

• Introduction§1 Problem of the New§2 Problem of Relations§3 Problem of Emergence§4 Problem of One and Many§5 Plato and the Third Man Argument (TMA)Plato’s Theory of FormsVlastos on Third Man ArgumentGail Fine and the Imperfection ArgumentThe New and the Third Man ArgumentThe Imperfection Argument and Degrees of Being/NoveltyProblem of Becoming in PlatoPhilebus and the Method of MixtureRelative and Absolute Relations §6 Bradley and the Problem of RelationsTMA and RegressBradley on RelationsBradley Regress and TMAImperfection Argument and Bradley RegressRelative and Absolute Relations (again)§7 Moore, Russell, and the Birth of Analytic PhilosophyBirth of Analytic PhilosophyMoore on BradleyMoorean Brute Facts and End to RegressRussell on BradleyMoore/Russell on Brute FactsDefending BradleyMichael Della Rocca on the Method of IntuitionDella Rocca’s Spinozist Solution to the Problem of RelationsMethod of Intuition and Analytic Philosophy of TimeMonism or Pluralism?§8 Russell and Deleuze on LeibnizRussell on the Task of Analysis (and on the taste of coffee) Russell on LeibnizDeleuze on LeibnizClear and Distinct/Confused and Obscure; or, on Differential Unconscious§9 On Problematic FieldsPlato, Leibniz, and Problematic FieldsProblematic Fields and Field TheoryBourdieu on FieldsRussell on Externality of Relations to TermsProblematic Fields and Bourdieu’s Fields contrastedAustin and PerformativesWeimar Republic and November 20, 1923Problematic Fields and External CircumstancesOn LearningProblematic Fields and Platonic Ideas§10 Kant and Problematic IdeasKant and PlatoInfinity and AntinomiesReturning to Kant and HumeUnity of ConsciousnessKant, Russell, and the Otherness of the GivenKant, Infinite Regresses, and Infinite TasksPossible Experience and Real ExperienceKant’s Left-Hand ParadoxKant, Plato, and FregeKant and the Problematic Idea§11 D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis on Problem of One and ManyKant’s Transcendental IllusionFrege and the Third Man ArgumentArmstrong on UniversalsLewis on Universals and Natural PropertiesClasses and IndividualsThe Trouble with SingletonsLewis and RegressesNatural Properties and Humean SuperveniencePrimacy of the Determinate Philebus and LewisProblematic Ideas as Non-Mereological Part of Determinate§12 Determinables and DeterminatesProblem of EmergenceJessica Wilson and Fundamental DeterminablesWilson and DeleuzeUexküll’s ticksMetaphysical Indeterminacy and the Primacy of the DeterminateDeterminables and Problematic Ideas§13 The Limits of Representational ThoughtPredicates as Determinates or Determinables?Mark Wilson on PredicatesHasok Chang on Inventing TemperatureMark Wilson on Theory FaçadesHusserl and the ‘constitutive becoming of the world’Husserl and American neo-realism; or, Hook and Nagel invent Analytic PhilosophyHeidegger, Carnap, and the Purification of Everyday Language Husserl’s Humean PhenomenologyHusserl and Regress of ConsciousnessHusserl and Problem of SingletonsHusserl and LebensphilosophieProblematic Ideas and SingletonsDeleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism§14 Learning from a Cup of CoffeeMark Wilson, Temperature, and Theory FaçadesTranscendental Empiricism and Real ExperienceAdorno’s Negative DialecticsAdorno’s non-conceptual objectivityEthnomethodology and the Taste of CoffeeObjectivity and Problematic Ideas§15 Carnap and the Fate of MetaphysicsCarnap’s "Elimination of Metaphysics"Regresses and Logical AnalysisWilfrid Sellars and the Myth of the GivenMcDowell and World-Disclosing ExperienceDreyfus on McDowell; or, on non-conceptual experienceMcDowell replies, and Jason Stanley on SkillMacFarlane on McDowell; or,the Problem of Mathematical ExperienceLewis and Singletons, againMeillassoux, Contingency, and MathematicsHuw Price, Pragmatic Relevance, and the Fate of MetaphysicsMonism or Pluralism?§16 Truth and RelevanceArbitrary Accounts and Infinite RegressesBrute Facts or Spinozist Bullet?Davidson’s Coherence Theory of TruthDavidson on LanguageProblematic Ideas; or, Pluralism = MonismProblematic Ideas and the Relevance of the DeterminateLiving the Problem; or, the inescapable social fieldMeillassoux and the primacy of the determinateTowards a Humean Political TheoryConclusionBibliography

With stunning erudition, interdisciplinary insight, and characteristic boldness, Bell highlights the vicissitudes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Equally at home in the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, as well as in both analytical and continental traditions, this　pluralist manifesto powerfully challenges the one-sided alliance with science that has led to an unfortunate scaling back of philosophy's traditional pursuit　of the questions of relevance and meaning.