Ineffability and its Metaphysics

Silvia Jonas is a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow at The Van Leer Institute and a Visiting Researcher at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel. She completed her PhD at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and holds a BPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford as well as an MLitt in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews, UK.

• 1. Introduction1.1. Getting a Grip on the Topic1.2. The Relevant Cases1.3. A Brief History of Ineffability1.4. Four Ways of Predicate Application1.5. Structure of the Book 2. Terminology 2.1. Content 2.2. Representations2.3. Experience2.4. Truth and Truth-Bearers2.5. Expressibility and Ineffability3. Ineffable Properties and Objects3.1. Why Ineffable Properties and Objects? 3.2. The Absolute3.3. Haecceities3.4. Bare Particulars4. Ineffable Propositions 4.1. Why Ineffable Propositions? 4.2. Inaccessibility 4.3. Semantic Paradoxes4.4. Unformulable Mathematical Propositions4.5. Excess Propositions4.6. Perspective Propositions5. Ineffable Content5.1. Why Ineffable Content? 5.2. Non-Conceptual Concept in Perception5.3. The Contents of Aesthetic Experience5.4. The Contents of Religious Experience 6. Ineffable Knowledge I6.1. Why Ineffable Knowledge? 6.2. Objective Ineffable Knowledge6.3. Knowledge-How6.4. Basic Logical Knowledge6.5. Non-Representational Knowledge 7. Ineffable Knowledge II 7.1. Subjective Ineffable Knowledge 7.2. Indexical Knowledge7.3. Phenomenal Knowledge7.4. Self-Acquaintance 8. Conclusion 9. Bibliography

"A rare combination of first-rate analytical philosophy with a grand metaphysical ambition." - Michael Inwood, University of Oxford, UK "A clear and lucid investigation of a notoriously difficult topic, bringing together an impressive range of contemporary scholarship and probing in places deeper than existing literature." - Edward Kanterian, University of Kent, USA