Idealization and the Aims of Science

Angela Potochnik is professor in the Department of Philosophy and director of the Center for Public Engagement with Science at the University of Cincinnati.

• Preface1 Introduction: Doing Science in a Complex World1.1 Science by Humans1.2 Science in a Complex World1.3 The Payoff: Idealizations and Many Aims2 Complex Causality and Simplified Representation2.1 Causal Patterns in the Face of Complexity2.1.1 Causal Patterns2.1.2 Causal Complexity2.2 Simplification by Idealization2.2.1 Reasons to Idealize2.2.2 Idealizations’ Representational Role2.2.3 Rampant and Unchecked Idealization3 The Diversity of Scientific Projects3.1 Broad Patterns: Modeling Cooperation3.2 A Specific Phenomenon: Variation in Human Aggression3.3 Predictions and Idealizations in the Physical Sciences3.4 Surveying the Diversity4 Science Isn’t after the Truth4.1 The Aims of Science4.1.1 Understanding as Science’s Epistemic Aim4.1.2 Separate Pursuit of Science’s Aims4.2 Understanding, Truth, and Knowledge4.2.1 The Nature of Scientific Understanding4.2.2 The Role of Truth and Scientific Knowledge5 Causal Pattern Explanations5.1 Explanation, Communication, and Understanding5.2 An Account of Scientific Explanation5.2.1 The Scope of Causal Patterns5.2.2 The Crucial Role of the Audience5.2.3 Adequate Explanations6 Levels and Fields of Science6.1 Levels in Philosophy and Science6.2 Going without Levels6.2.1 Against Hierarchy6.2.2 Prizing Apart Forms of Stratification6.3 The Fields of Science and How They Relate7 Scientific Pluralism and Its Limits7.1 The Entrenchment of Social Values7.2 How Science Doesn’t Inform Metaphysics7.3 Scientific ProgressAcknowledgmentsList of FiguresList of TablesNotesReferencesIndex

“Angela Potochnik’s ambitious book is an antidote to the view that the philosophy of science tries to pronounce grandly on what scientists ought to do."