Having It Both Ways

Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics

Inbunden, Engelska, 2015

Av Guy Fletcher, Guy Fletcher, Michael Ridge, Edinburgh) Fletcher, Guy (Lecturer in Philosophy, Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh) Ridge, Michael (Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh

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A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2015-01-08
Mått236 x 155 x 30 mm
Vikt567 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieOxford Moral Theory
Antal sidor320
FörlagOUP USA
ISBN9780199347582

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Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Contributors ; Introduction ; Part I ; 1. How to Insult a Philosopher ; Michael Ridge ; 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics ; Daniel Boisvert ; 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral Motivation ; David Copp ; 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-Generality ; Ryan Hay ; 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism ; Jon Tresan ; 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement ; Stephen Finlay ; 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning. ; John Eriksson ; Part II ; 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature ; Guy Fletcher ; 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature ; Stephen Barker ; 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View? ; Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias ; 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment ; Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter ; 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics ; Mark Schroeder ; Bibliography ; Index

The variety, breadth, and depth of these essays make the collection well worth exploring. Metaethics has always drawn from other areas of philosophy to make progress, and in this volume you can see that in spades. The emphasis is in using recent developments in the philosophy of language and mind to open the door to new ways of conceiving of moral discourse. It would be unreasonable to expect to find any finished hybrid theories here, as the contributors are still working out the details, but it would be even more unreasonable to ignore the progress being made.