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Economic players must often choose between several strategic options in a fierce competitive environment where interactions with competitors make decisions particularly complex. Game theory offers useful insights to choose an optimal decision or at least a basis for making rational decision given the constraints of the stakeholders' environment. In presenting the concepts and the logical structure of the reasoning offered by game theory and their applications, the book explains the rational process of decision making in the framework of firm management and market competition. By avoiding the usual complexity of presentation often due to mathematical formalism, the book proposes a reflection and practical insights of game theory for practitioners (managers, strategists) and social, managerial and economic researchers. The book will expose both general teachings and a comprehensive analysis applied to specific case studies of various sectors of the economy.
Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI – Researcher - National Agronomic Research Institute.Nabyla DAIDJ, Teacher-Researcher (PhD).
Introduction ixChapter 1. Game Theory and Strategic Management 11.1. Game theory and strategic management: semantic and/or conceptual convergences? 11.2. The current position of game theory in strategic management 71.2.1. Game theory and the school of positioning 71.2.2. Growing interest for game theory 131.3. The theoretical determinants of coopetition: borrowed from game theory 161.3.1. The origin of coopetition 161.3.2. Coopetitive practices 181.3.3. Mechanisms of value creation in the value network (value net) 211.4. Conclusion 25Chapter 2. From Static Games to Dynamic Approaches 272.1. Introduction 272.2. Strategies and solution concepts: static games 282.2.1. Decentralized concepts 282.2.2. Maximin and Minimax solutions or the search for a new level of security 412.3. Process of dynamic decisions: solutions concepts 442.3.1. “Non-cooperative collusion” or “tacit collusion” 452.3.2. Sequential games 562.4. Conclusion 69Chapter 3. Coalitions Formation 713.1. Introduction 713.2. The notion of a coalition and the cooperative approach 733.3. Emergence of cooperation: from collective rationality to individual rationality 843.3.1. Some illustrations 843.3.2. Emergence of cooperation 863.4. A simple conceptual frame of analysis for cooperation: notions of internal and external stability of a coalition 903.4.1. The concept of stability as a basic property of cooperation 923.4.2. The stability as an equilibrium property of a game 933.4.3. Examples 963.4.4. The role of heterogeneities 993.4.5. R&D in a context of asymmetrical firms 1033.5. Conclusion 105Chapter 4. Application 1: Dieselgate 1074.1. Introduction 1074.2. Storytelling: for those who missed the beginning 1084.3. Presentation of the facts and strategic reading 1104.4. The strategic variables and the associated game 1154.4.1. The rules of the game 1164.4.2. Payoff 1214.5. Game resolution and strategic analysis 1234.5.1. Perfect equilibrium of the game where fraud is deterred 1254.5.2. Perfect equilibrium with the firm committing fraud 1284.6. Conclusion 134Chapter 5. Application 2: Emergence of Food Safety Standards 1375.1. Introduction 1375.2. The game 1405.3. Nash equilibrium 1455.4. Conclusion 154Chapter 6. Application 3: Petrol Stations 1576.1. Introduction: price structure of a multi-store firm and fragilization of isolated competitors 1576.2. The facts 1576.3. Strategic management questions 1616.4. The game 1636.5. Price structure in the event of collusion 1656.6. Price war threat and game equilibrium 1716.7 Game equilibrium within a time horizon 1736.8. Conclusion 177Chapter 7. Application 4: HD-DVD versus Blu-ray 1817.1. Introduction: individual strategies and collective dynamics 1817.2. Constitution of HD-DVD and Blu-ray consortiums 1827.3. Definition of the game 1867.4. Numerical application 1917.5. Conclusion 195Conclusion 199Appendices 203Appendix 1 205Appendix 2 231Bibliography 239Index 259