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Attiat Ott and Richard Cebula have recognised the need to present, in an accessible and straightforward way, the voluminous literature in the public economics arena. Advances in econometric techniques and the spillover of knowledge from other disciplines made it difficult, not only for students but also for lecturers, to accurately find the information they need.This major Companion addresses a wealth of topics common to the study of both public economics and public choice including questions such as: How does one structure the whole spectrum of public finance in a manageable framework? What is Wagner's Law really about and what does empirical testing tell us? How binding is the budget constraint? How encompassing is a dictator's interest? How do veto powers of the executive, institutional structures and regimes affect public sector outcomes? Do voters behave rationally? Do conflicts yield benefits? Is war cost effective and does secession offer a viable exit option? The contributions, both theoretical and empirical, shed light on some contentious issues in the public economics literature and provide readers with insight into issues that are at the forefront of discussions about the public economy. The empirical analysis utilizes recent econometric techniques to validate or refute empirical findings based on older 'vintage' econometrics. The diversity of coverage ranges from traditional models of the public economy to the incorporation of defence spending as a significant and often neglected function of the public sector. The contributors include many pioneers and leading lights in the field.The Elgar Companion to Public Economics will be required reading for academics and scholars at many levels in the fields of public economics and public choice but mainly graduate and above. The Companion will also be of value to scholars in the wider social sciences in general and political science in particular.
Edited by Attiat F. Ott, formerly Professor of Economics and President, Institute for Economic Policy Studies, Clark University and Richard J. Cebula, Billy J. Walker/Wells Fargo Endowed Chair of Finance, Jacksonville University, US
Contents: Preface Introduction and Background Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. CebulaPart I: The Public Economy 1. Public Finance and the Three Branch ModelRichard A. Musgrave2. The Empirics of the Three Branch ModelAttiat F. Ott3. Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities Alan Peacock4. Wagner’s Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach James E. Payne, Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi5. Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why? Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj6. Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A SurveyRobert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha7. Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa Rita BabihugaPart II: Public Sector Provision8. The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee9. Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public GoodsSoma Ghosh10. Economics of Conflict Keith Hartley11. Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data Rati Ram12. The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and TurkeyJulide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir Öcal Part III: Re-Shaping Public Sector Outcomes in a Democracy13. Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner14. Direct Democracy and Tiebout ExitNirupama Devaraj15. An Extension of the Rational Voter ModelRichard J. Cebula and Gordon Tullock16. A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating Richard J. Cebula17. Line Item Veto: Lessons from the LiteratureDavid Schap18. An Analysis of the UN Security Council VetoNevila Kote Part IV: Models of Public Sector Behavior 19. The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott20. The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing ModelsTrufat Woldesenbet21. What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith Vjacheslav Dombrovsky22. Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. JonesReferences Index