Economic Constitutionalism in a Turbulent World

Edited by Achilles Skordas, Professor Emeritus, University of Bristol, UK, and Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany, Gábor Halmai, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and Lisa Mardikian, Senior Lecturer in Law, Brunel University London, UK

• Contents:Introduction to Economic Constitutionalism in a Turbulent World 1Achilles Skordas, Lisa Mardikian, and Gábor HalmaiPART I RETHINKING CORE TENETS OF ECONOMICCONSTITUTIONALISM1 Where’s the ‘e’ in constitution? A European puzzle 11Neil Walker2 Imaginary of the imperium of prosperity and economicconstitutionalism in the EU 38Jiř’ Přib‡ň3 Including a cognitive perspective into a vision of‘transformative constitutionalism’ 64Karl-Heinz LadeurPART II ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EU4 Economic constitutionalism, the challenge of populismand the role of the constituent power 87Andrew Arato and Gábor Halmai5 The European Court of Justice and the protection offundamental rights under the new economic governanceof the Eurozone 109Paul Dermine6 Varieties of Member State capitalisms and the Europeaneconomic constitution 136Márton Varju and Mónika Papp7 Economic constitutionalism and the constitutionalisationof the internal market 161Csongor István Nagy8 Reframing EU citizenship as stakeholder constituency,or… why the Court of Justice got it right on economicallyinactive EU citizens 183Lisa MardikianPART III ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISMAND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS IN THEGLOBALISED ECONOMY9 Can multilevel economic constitutionalism restrain tradeprotectionism and power politics? 222Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann10 Market freedoms and ‘democratically sound’re-embedding of markets? 250Carola Glinski11 Why cosmopolitan pluralist governance need not subvertdemocracy 281Paul Schiff Berman12 International judicial authority, social systems and geoeconomics 298Achilles SkordasIndex

‘Constitutions regulate by what they say, but also by what they do not. Economic constitutionalism is often invisible, and as this volume of essays makes clear, can be utterly consequential. By bringing much needed attention to the phenomenon, the authors collectively have made an important contribution to our understanding of constitutional politics.’