Designs for Democratic Stability

Abdo I. Baaklini, Helen Desfosses

• Chapter 1 Viable Constitutionalism and Democratic Political Stability, Abdo I. Baaklini; Part 1 Important Characteristics of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government; Chapter 2 The “Westminster Model” Away from Westminster: Is It Always the Most Appropriate Model?, Gregory S. Mahler; Chapter 3 The U.S. Presidential System as a Model for the World, James L. Sundquist; Chapter 4 Bureaucracy: Control, Responsiveness, Performance, Joel D. Aberbach, Bert A. Rockman; Chapter 5 Bureaucracy and Viable Constitutionalism, Fred W. Riggs; Chapter 6 Legislative Structure and Constitutional Viability in Societies Undergoing Democratic Transition, Abdo I. Baaklini; Part 2 Case Studies in Designing a Viable Constitution; Chapter 7 The Constitution as an Instrument of Political Cohesion in Postcolonial States: The Case of India, 1950–1993, T. V. Sathyamurthy; Chapter 8 Constitutional Viability and Political Institutions in Turkish Democracy, Ersin Kalaycio?lu; Chapter 9 Can Viable Constitutionalism Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, Erik P. Hoffmann; Part 3 Limitations of Constitutionalism; Chapter 10 Democratic Consolidation: Institutional, Economic, and External Dimensions, Diane Ethier; Chapter 11 Globalization and the Residual State: The Challenge to Viable Constitutionalism, Philip G. Cerny;