Designing Financial Supervision Institutions

Edited by Donato Masciandaro, Full Professor of Economics and Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation, Bocconi University, Italy and Marc Quintyn, Division Chief, International Monetary Fund’s Institute, US

• Contents:Foreword Donato Masciandaro and Marc QuintynIntroduction Charles GoodhartPART I: INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE1. Robust Regulators and their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in TheoryMarc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European SettingLorenzo Bini Smaghi 3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Supervisors in PracticeMarc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics MattersJonathan Westrup5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and PracticesMarco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro GambiniPART II: THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS6. Financial Supervision Architecture and Central Bank IndependenceAndreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking SupervisionMarco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of SupervisionMartin Čihák and Richard Podpiera9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A PrimerDonato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast PART III: IN SEARCH OF THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS11. Bureaucrats or Politicians?Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini12. Agency Problems in Banking SupervisionRobert A. EisenbeisIndex

'This is a collection of essays written by eminent economists and policy studies scholars. . . this is a useful book in its presentation of empirical research to policymakers, lawyers and economists on a subject of immense interest and currency.'