Deliberate Discretion?

• 1. Laws, bureaucratic autonomy and the comparative study of delegation; 2. Rational delegation or helpless abdication? The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians; 3. Statutes as blueprints for policy making processes; 4. A comparative theory of legislative discretion and the policy making process; 5. Legislation, agency policy making and Medicaid in Michigan; 6. The design of laws across separation of powers systems; 7. The design of laws across parliamentary systems; 8. Laws, institutions, and policy making processes.

'This is a remarkable book. It is embedded firmly in the well-established 'new institutionalist' literature on comparative politics. And it extends a well-recognized debate over how (and how carefully) elected politicians delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats. Yet, for all its pedigree, it is original, innovative, and important. It is bold in its theoretical scope, impressive for its painstaking attention to empirical detail, and, for all that, a pleasure to read … This will be the most important book in delegation since Kiewiet and McCubbins's The Logic of Delegation a decade ago.' Japanese Journal of Political Science