Nasser Behnegar, Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College Review of Hume's Humanity: The Philosophy of Common Life and Its Limits Scott Yenor's manuscript emerges out of the influential tradition of Hume scholarship inaugurated by Donald Livingston's Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Livingston connects Hume's conservative politics to his epistemology by arguing that Hume's skepticism was an attempt to establish a mode of philosophizing that acknowledges the acceptance of common or necessary presuppositions that underlie social life. Accordingly, this interpretation tends to separate Hume from the Enlightenment philosophers and emphasizes the degree to which Hume was a critic of modern philosophy and rationalism. But Hume's attitude toward religion and commercial society puts him squarely in the camp of the modern philosophers and the men of the Enlightenment. I believe Livingston and his followers do not squarely face this difficulty. The great merit of Yenor's manuscript is that it treats this issue thematically. Yenor accepts Livingston's view that Hume sought to ground philosophy on common sense or necessary presuppositions of the human mind, but he argues that Hume's treatment of history and religion rests on controversial assumptions, and that this failure of Hume's was not accidental because these subjects (especially religion) do not allow for a non-controversial position. He qualifies this conclusion by suggesting that a return to pre-modern thought (based on Leo Strauss's reflections) might be able to rescue common life philosophy from value pluralism. The organization of the work into three parts (epistemology, morals-politics, and religion) seems well-conceived to me. But I have to say that two of the three sample chapters do not read well and are in need of further editing. Chapter four could use an introductory section that articulates the argument of the whole chapter. Chapter six begins with two criticisms of German historical school (which Yenor applies to Hume's historical reflections), but in the course of the chapter he does not return to these criticisms. The transitions from one section to the next are not always smooth. And in all three chapters, there are places where the presentation could benefit from greater conceptual precision. For instance, it would help if Yenor distinguished between general rules derived from history that have the character of causal relations and general rules that are moral norms. Overall, the argument of this work has the potential of provoking thoughtful debate among Hume scholars, and therefore has the promise of being a significant contribution to the literature, if it is honed more. As to the audience of the work, it should include not only Hume scholars but also those who are interested in the thought of Strauss, the Enlightenment, and anyone interested in the relation of religion and philosophy in modern times. Of course, major libraries would be attracted to a work that speaks to these various readers.
