Corruption and Reform in India

Jennifer Bussell is an Assistant Professor of Public Affairs in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research focuses on comparative politics, the political economy of development, and technology policy and has appeared in journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly and Studies in Comparative International Development. She received a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 2009.

• Preface and acknowledgments; 1. Introduction; 2. The politics of reform in the digital age; 3. Do reforms affect the quality of services?; 4. Timing of reform: policy initiation in the Indian states; 5. Scope of reform I: patterns of policy implementation; 6. Scope of reform II: coalition governments; 7. Scale and management of reform: from 'petty' to 'grand' corruption; 8. Technology-enabled administrative reform in cross-national perspective; 9. Conclusion.

'Throughout the developing world, administrative reforms, such as the introduction of electronic public service delivery systems, have been hailed as necessary to improve democratic accountability and responsiveness. By increasing access to public services and reducing politicians' control over this access, such progressive policies promise to improve the lot for poor citizens in countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet politicians' incentives are different. Jennifer Bussell shows that when such policies threaten politicians' ability to garner 'rents' from petty corruption, they block reform. Fascinatingly, however, some of these reforms are implemented in other states by equally corrupt politicians who are less dependent on petty theft and specialize in 'grand' corruption. This compelling - if disturbing - analysis … uses case studies, field experiments, interviews, and statistical data to make its case … academic detective work at its very best.' Irfan Nooruddin, Ohio State University