Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. This new methodology is used first against holism. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism, and in the process rejects direct-reference, two-factor, and verificationist theories. The book concludes by arguing against revisionism, eliminativism, and the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings to explain behaviour.
Introduction; 1. A critique of the case for semantic holism; 2. The methodology of naturalistic semantics; 3. A case for semantic localism; 4. Meanings and their ascription; 5. Eliminativism and revisionism.
'On the whole, this is a serious, realistic piece of applied philosophy, one that this particular much-polluted piece of the intellectual landscape can very well do with.' Philosophy