Belief, Agency, and Knowledge

Essays on Epistemic Normativity

Häftad, Engelska, 2025

AvMatthew Chrisman,University of Edinburgh) Chrisman, Matthew (Professor of Ethics and Epistemology, Professor of Ethics and Epistemology

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Epistemology is not just about the nature of knowledge or the analysis of concepts such as 'knows' and 'justified'. It is also about what we ought to believe and how we ought to investigate and reason about what is true. This book is a study of these normative aspects of epistemology. More specifically, it is concerned with the nature of epistemic norms and their relation both to the value of knowledge and to the structure of cognitive agency. The first part develops a theory of doxastic agency according to which believers exercise agency centrally in the ongoing activity of maintaining systems of belief. The second part defends an account of the grip epistemic norms have on us and the nature of our epistemic values. These are explained in terms of the way that a person's belief, can be subject to robust social norms and be valued for its stability not only individually, but, crucially, within epistemic communities. The third part proposes inferentialist foundations for a meta-epistemological theory of epistemic discourse that takes seriously the idea that knowledge attributions are partly normative, and hence should be partly classified on the 'ought' side of the division between claims about what reality is like, and claims about what people ought to do, think, and feel.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2025-12-31
Mått156 x 13 x 235 mm
Vikt359 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor234
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780198993421

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Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Matthew Chrisman is Professor of Ethics and Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. His research is focused on epistemology, metaethics, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. He has published widely in these areas, including articles in Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy & Public Affairs, and The Journal of Philosophy. Chrisman is the author of The Meaning of 'Ought' and What Is This Thing Called Metaethics? He was elected a member of the Young Academy of Scotland in 2016, where he led in creation of the Young Academy of Scotland's Charter for Responsible Debate. He completed his PhD and MA at the University of North Carolina, and his BA at Rice University.

1: IntroductionPART I: DOXASTIC AGENCY2: Beliefs are States not Performances3: Belief Formation Doesn't Exhaust Doxastic Agency4: The Activity of Maintaining BeliefsPART II: EPISTEMIC NORMS5: The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth6: Doxastic Involuntarism and 'Ought to Believe'7: Social Foundations for Epistemic NormativityPART III: EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE8: From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism9: From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism

Belief, Agency and Knowledge is a triumph. It provides a sustained defense of a truly social approach to human knowledge, one which rejects the longstanding philosophical assumption that knowing is something we do in isolation, and instead embraces the community as the starting point of any epistemological investigation. In so doing, it provides a strikingly original account of the norms of inquiry and sheds light on free belief, the pursuit of truth and the role of responsible belief in democracy.