Airpower over the Rhine

James F. Slaughter III is a course designer and adjunct professor at Norwich University in Vermont. He holds multiple degrees in history and education, including a PhD in history from the University of Wolverhampton, and has published a number of pieces on the history of World War II in Europe. His primary interests are France and Germany from 1870 to 1945, with an emphasis on the development of doctrine and security policy and the interaction of society and government. He resides in South Charleston, West Virginia, with his wife, son, and the family dog.

"James Slaughter’s Airpower Over the Rhine is a refreshing and valuable re-examination of aerial aspects of the French failure in 1940.  Slaughter examines not just the aircraft involved but the issues that weakened France:  fear of retaliation prevented strategic bombing, fear of radio insecurity prevented management of air assets, domestic politics made leaders suspect their subordinates, a multitude of air frames hamstrung maintenance, and pilot training was woefully inadequate.  Yet, this superb study contends, France overcame all obstacles to contribute equally to Britain in wearing down the Luftwaffe during May 1940.  This incisive study belongs on the shelves of all military and French historians."  —Jonathan M. House, professor emeritus of military history at the United States Army Command and General Staff College and author of When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler"For eighty-five years, historians, soldiers, politicians, and informed writers have sought to explain Nazi Germany’s decisive victory over France in June 1940. Beyond the societal and political commentary, a common thread in most military commentary has been that the French Air Force simply failed to do its duty to defend the nation. James F. Slaughter II destroys that myth in his Airpower Over the Rhine. Slaughter explains how the effect of political divisiveness and subordination to an army headquarters that refused to employ radar and radios to coordinate action hindered operations. Yet, although fighting without practical aviation doctrine and flying obsolete and under-armed aircraft, these pilots continually took off to challenge the enemy invaders. While unable to stave off defeat, as German sources admit, French fighters inflicted almost as many casualties on the Luftwaffe as the Royal Air Force. Slaughter’s thought-provoking and thoroughly researched study will change how future historians interpret the 'Strange Defeat.'"—Stephen A. Bourque, author of Beyond the Beach: the Allied War Against France"Slaughter's outstanding book is essential in understanding the development of aerial warfare in World War II. He demonstrates a masterful command of sources and historical interpretations in resurrecting the reputation of the French Air Force. Though soundly defeated by the Luftwaffe and severely disadvantaged throughout the battle, the brave French pilots battered the Luftwaffe in a manner from which they never recovered."—Mike Bechthold, author of Flying to Victory: Raymond Collishaw and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941"Slaughter offers a lucid modern take on the French Air Force performance during the Battle of France, enriched through his fresh assessments of intertwined factors such as contemporaneous French military intelligence, unheeded lessons of the Spanish Civil War, and tumultuous French domestic politics, revealing nuanced original perspectives and causal shortcomings that originate much earlier than those observed on and over the Meuse and Somme battlefields in the Spring of 1940."—Col. Brian Vlaun, USAF, Ph.D., author of Selling Schweinfurt: Targeting, Assessment, and Marketing in the Air Campaign Against German Industry