Benedikt Paul Göcke is a junior research fellow in philosophy at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University.

"This volume contains much interesting material, and it is important to examine and carefully evaluate both the problems that physicalism has as well as the prospects of rival positions. . . . This volume certainly constitutes an important contribution to the decade." —Mind"Göcke has assembled a collection of 11 essays—9 of which are here printed for the first time—that usefully showcase the rich options available to readers in attempting to understand the mind outside a physicalistic framework. . . . Although different readers likely will gravitate to different essays, the collection as a whole offers much of interest to anyone grappling with questions about the nature of the mental." —Choice"This is a remarkable book, which can be used as a textbook in philosophy of mind as well as in philosophy of religion courses, and which also opens up the debate in an original way among colleagues at an advanced level." —Fergus Kerr, University of Edinburgh"I found this to be an interesting collection of articles on a very significant topic. Benedikt Paul Göcke is correct to affirm that contemporary physicalism about human persons is in something of a crisis mode, in which most philosophers are sure that some form of physicalism must be true, but no one has a convincing account of how physicalism could be true. The time is right for a new look at dualism, and, for the most part, this book delivers just that." —C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University"This is a timely and important book. Conventional, mechanistic physicalism clearly suffers from major difficulties, not the least of which are the incompleteness of modern physics and the inability to account for qualitative experience and consciousness. The time is right to examine our other options: dualism, pluralism, and alternate forms of monism. There is indeed 'life after physicalism,' and this book paves the way." —David Skrbina, University of Michigan–Dearborn

Benedikt Paul Göcke is a junior research fellow in philosophy at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University.

"This volume contains much interesting material, and it is important to examine and carefully evaluate both the problems that physicalism has as well as the prospects of rival positions. . . . This volume certainly constitutes an important contribution to the decade." —Mind"Göcke has assembled a collection of 11 essays—9 of which are here printed for the first time—that usefully showcase the rich options available to readers in attempting to understand the mind outside a physicalistic framework. . . . Although different readers likely will gravitate to different essays, the collection as a whole offers much of interest to anyone grappling with questions about the nature of the mental." —Choice"This is a remarkable book, which can be used as a textbook in philosophy of mind as well as in philosophy of religion courses, and which also opens up the debate in an original way among colleagues at an advanced level." —Fergus Kerr, University of Edinburgh"I found this to be an interesting collection of articles on a very significant topic. Benedikt Paul Göcke is correct to affirm that contemporary physicalism about human persons is in something of a crisis mode, in which most philosophers are sure that some form of physicalism must be true, but no one has a convincing account of how physicalism could be true. The time is right for a new look at dualism, and, for the most part, this book delivers just that." —C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University"This is a timely and important book. Conventional, mechanistic physicalism clearly suffers from major difficulties, not the least of which are the incompleteness of modern physics and the inability to account for qualitative experience and consciousness. The time is right to examine our other options: dualism, pluralism, and alternate forms of monism. There is indeed 'life after physicalism,' and this book paves the way." —David Skrbina, University of Michigan–Dearborn

Benedikt Paul Göcke is a junior research fellow in philosophy at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford University.

"This volume contains much interesting material, and it is important to examine and carefully evaluate both the problems that physicalism has as well as the prospects of rival positions. . . . This volume certainly constitutes an important contribution to the decade." —Mind"Göcke has assembled a collection of 11 essays—9 of which are here printed for the first time—that usefully showcase the rich options available to readers in attempting to understand the mind outside a physicalistic framework. . . . Although different readers likely will gravitate to different essays, the collection as a whole offers much of interest to anyone grappling with questions about the nature of the mental." —Choice"This is a remarkable book, which can be used as a textbook in philosophy of mind as well as in philosophy of religion courses, and which also opens up the debate in an original way among colleagues at an advanced level." —Fergus Kerr, University of Edinburgh"I found this to be an interesting collection of articles on a very significant topic. Benedikt Paul Göcke is correct to affirm that contemporary physicalism about human persons is in something of a crisis mode, in which most philosophers are sure that some form of physicalism must be true, but no one has a convincing account of how physicalism could be true. The time is right for a new look at dualism, and, for the most part, this book delivers just that." —C. Stephen Evans, Baylor University"This is a timely and important book. Conventional, mechanistic physicalism clearly suffers from major difficulties, not the least of which are the incompleteness of modern physics and the inability to account for qualitative experience and consciousness. The time is right to examine our other options: dualism, pluralism, and alternate forms of monism. There is indeed 'life after physicalism,' and this book paves the way." —David Skrbina, University of Michigan–Dearborn