Advanced Materials Innovation

Dr. Sanford L. Moskowitz is Associate Professor of Global Business at St. John's University and the College of St. Benedict (Collegeville, MN). Dr. Moskowitz specializes in the evolution of advanced global technologies and their markets. He is a consultant to global business in the area of innovation and technological development and has delivered key-note presentations on advanced materials and related technologies at academic and professional conferences within the US and internationally. His views on the future of advanced material development have appeared in such publications as The Economist and Wired Magazine. Dr. Moskowitz is the author of The Advanced Materials Revolution: Technology and Economic Growth in the Age of Globalization (2009, John Wiley & Sons). Dr. Moskowitz holds a B.S. in physics from the City College of New York (CCNY) and an M.S., M. Phil. and Ph.D. in economic and business history from Columbia University (New York, N.Y.).

• PREFACE xviiACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxviiPART I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 11 Advanced Materials Innovation: An Overview 31.1 The Advanced Materials Revolution, 31.2 The Economic Impact of Advanced Materials, 61.2.1 Information and Computer Technology, 81.2.2 Energy, 91.2.3 Biotechnology and Health Care, 101.2.4 Transportation, 111.2.5 Construction, Infrastructure, and Manufacturing, 121.3 Advanced Material Innovation: The Main Players, 13References, 15PART II STRUCTURAL MATERIALS: METALS AND POLYMERS 172 Advanced Casting Technology: Ultrathin Steel and the Microalloys 192.1 Introduction, 192.2 Background, 202.2.1 Thick Slab Casting and “Big Steel”, 202.2.2 The Mini- and Micromill Revolution: Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting, 212.2.3 Ultrathin Steel and Microalloys, 222.3 Nucor Steel: Ground Zero for the Mini (and Micro-)-Mill Revolution, 232.3.1 Nucor’s Flexible Structure, 242.3.2 Ken Iverson and Nucor, 242.3.3 Nucor Builds a Steel Minimill, 252.4 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Research and Development, 272.4.1 Thin Slab Casting, 272.4.2 Thin Strip Casting, 282.5 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Scale-Up, 302.5.1 The Challenges of Scaling, 302.5.2 Nucor and Reducing the Risks of Scaling, 312.5.2.1 Structural Risks, 312.5.2.2 Resource Risks: Capital, Raw Materials, and Labor, 322.5.2.3 Experiential Risks, 342.6 Thin Slab and Thin Strip Casting: Commercialization, 342.6.1 Commercializing the Thin Slab Process: Nucor’s “Internalized Static” Culture and Technology Selection, 352.6.2 Commercializing the Thin Strip Process: Nucor Creates a Dynamic Expansionist Culture, 36References, 383 High-Pressure Technology and Dupont’s Synthetic Fiber Revolution 413.1 Background: The High-Pressure Process and Advanced Materials, 423.1.1 The Nature of High-Pressure Synthesis, 423.1.2 DuPont: High-Pressure Synthesis and Its Road to Advanced Fibers, 443.1.2.1 DuPont’s Diversification Strategy, 443.1.2.2 DuPont Enters Upon—and Struggles with—High-Pressure Synthesis, 453.1.2.3 Roger Williams and the First-Generation High-Pressure Chemicals, 473.2 Dupont’s Nylon Revolution, 483.2.1 Charles Stine and DuPont’s Central Research Department, 493.2.2 Stine Finds His Star Scientist: Wallace Carothers, 513.2.3 Carothers and Nylon, 533.2.3.1 Nylon: Research Phase, 533.2.3.2 Nylon: Development, Scale-Up, and Commercialization, 563.3 Nylon’s Children: Orlon and Dacron, 603.3.1 Orlon, 613.3.1.1 Orlon: Research Phase, 613.3.1.2 Orlon: Development Phase, 633.3.1.3 Orlon: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 643.3.2 Dacron, 653.3.2.1 Dacron: Research Phase, 653.3.2.2 Dacron: Development, 663.3.2.3 Dacron: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 67References, 684 Low-Temperature (Interfacial) Polymerization: DuPont’s Specialty Fibers Versus General Electric’s Polycarbonate Revolution 714.1 Introduction and Background, 724.2 Dupont and Specialty Fibers, 744.2.1 Lycra Spandex and the Block Copolymers, 754.2.2 Kevlar and the Aramids, 774.3 General Electric and the Polycarbonates, 804.3.1 The Polycarbonates: Research Phase, 804.3.2 The Polycarbonates: Development and Scale-Up, 824.3.3 The Polycarbonates: Commercialization Phase—GE Research Shifts from an Internally Directed to Externally Oriented Culture, 854.3.3.1 The Patent Issue, 864.3.3.2 The Customer Issue, 87References, 885 Fluidization I: From Advanced Fuels to the Polysilicones 915.1 Background: Fluidization and Advanced Fuels, 915.1.1 Sun Oil and the Houdry Process, 925.1.2 Jersey Standard and the Fluidization Process, 945.2 General Electric and the Polysilicones, 1005.2.1 The Silicones: Initiation Phase, 1005.2.2 The Silicones: Research Phase, 1015.2.2.1 Early Research, 1015.2.2.2 Later Research, 1025.2.3 The Silicones: Development Phase, 1035.2.3.1 Early Development, 1035.2.3.2 Later Development, 1055.2.4 The Silicones: Commercialization Phase, 1075.2.4.1 Patents, 1085.2.4.2 Internal Use Versus External Customers, 108References, 1126 Fluidization II: Polyethylene, the Unipol Process, and the Metallocenes 1156.1 Background: Polyethylene and the Dupont Problem, 1166.1.1 DuPont and the Polychemicals Department, 1166.1.2 DuPont and Delrin Plastic, 1176.1.3 DuPont and Polyethylene, 1186.1.3.1 European Developments, 1186.1.3.2 DuPont and the “One Polyethylene” Strategy, 1206.1.3.3 DuPont and the High-Density Polyethylene Problem, 1216.1.3.4 DuPont and Fluidization, 1226.2 Union Carbide and the Polyolefins: The Unipol Process, 1226.2.1 Union Carbide and Polyethylene: Background, 1236.2.2 The Unipol Process: Initiation Phase, 1256.2.3 The Unipol Process: Research Phase, 1276.2.3.1 The Unipol Process: Development and Scale-Up Phases, 1296.2.4 The Unipol Process: Commercialization Phase, 1336.3 The Unipol Revolution and the Metallocene Polymers, 1376.3.1 Science and Technology of the Metallocenes, 1376.3.2 The Metallocene Era and Advanced Materials, 138References, 139PART III FUNCTIONAL MATERIALS: SEMICONDUCTORS 1437 Advanced Materials and the Integrated Circuit I: The Metal-on-Silicon (MOS) Process 1457.1 Background, 1467.1.1 The Vacuum Tube and Advanced Materials, 1467.2 Bell Labs and the Point-Contact Transistor, 1487.2.1 Bell Labs: The Early Years, 1487.2.2 Bell Semiconductor Research: The Leading Players, 1507.2.3 The Point-Contact Transistor, 1527.3 Shockley Semiconductor and the Junction Transistor, 1567.3.1 The Junction (Bipolar) Transistor, 1567.3.2 The Creation and Fall of Shockley Semiconductor, 1597.4 Fairchild Semiconductor: The Bipolar Company, 1607.4.1 The Silicon Transistor, 1607.4.2 The Planar Process, 1627.4.3 The Integrated Circuit, 1637.5 The MOS Technology at Bell and Fairchild, 1657.5.1 MOS Research at Bell Labs, 1657.5.2 MOS Research and Development at Fairchild, 1687.5.2.1 The Fairchild MOS Project: Initiation, Research, and Early Development, 1687.5.2.2 Development and Early Attempts at Scale-Up: Risk Analysis, 169References, 1768 Advanced Materials and the Integrated Circuit II: The Silicon Gate Process—The Memory Chip and the Microprocessor 1798.1 Background: Creating Intel, 1808.2 The MOS-SG Process: Research and Early Development, 1828.3 The MOS-SG Process: Development Phase—Perfecting the Process, 1828.4 The MOS-SG Process: Product Development, 1858.4.1 MOS-SG and Memory I: The “DRAM”, 1858.4.2 MOS-SG and Memory II: The “EPROM”, 1878.4.3 MOS-SG and the Microprocessor, 1898.4.3.1 Ted Hoff, Circuit Design, and Inventing the Microprocessor, 1898.4.3.2 Federico Faggin, the MOS-SG Process, and Making the Microprocessor, 1908.4.3.3 The Competitive Advantage of Intel’s Microprocessor, 1918.4.3.4 Championing the Microprocessor at Intel, 1928.5 MOS-SG: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 1948.5.1 Competition and Resource Allocation, 1968.5.2 The MOS-SG Process, Moore’s Law, and Intel’s “Internalized Short-Term Dynamic” Culture, 197References, 2009 The Epitaxial Process I: Bell Labs and the Semiconductor Laser 2039.1 Background: Advanced Materials, the Epitaxial Process, and Nonsilicon-based Microchips, 2049.2 Bell Labs and the Semiconductor Laser, 2069.2.1 The First Lasers, 2079.2.2 Early Research on the Semiconductor Laser in the United States, 2109.2.3 Bell’s Semiconductor Laser: Initiation and Research, 2119.2.4 Bell’s Semiconductor Laser: Development, 2129.2.4.1 Toward a Working Prototype, 2139.2.4.2 Resource Problems and Creative Bootstrapping, 2149.2.4.3 Development of the Semiconductor Laser Gains Importance at AT&T/Bell Labs, 2159.2.4.4 The Million-Hour Laser, 2179.2.5 Bell’s Semiconductor Laser: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 2189.2.5.1 The Semiconductor Laser Advances to Higher Wavelengths, 2189.2.5.2 Bell Faces Competition, 220References, 22110 The Epitaxial Process II: IBM and the Silicon–Germanium (SiGe) Chip 22310.1 IBM and its research, 22410.2 IBM and the Silicon–Germanium Chip, 22610.2.1 The Silicon–Germanium Chip: Initiation and Research Phases, 22610.2.1.1 A Question of Temperature, 22810.2.1.2 A Question of Layering: Molecular Beams Versus Chemical Vapor Deposition, 22910.2.1.3 The Germanium Solution, 23010.2.2 The Silicon–Germanium Chip: Development Phase, 23110.2.2.1 Internal Competition, 23110.2.2.2 Grappling with a Shifting Context and Shrinking Resources, 23310.2.2.3 Dealing with a Dynamic Market, 23510.2.3 The Silicon–Germanium Chip: Scale-Up and Commercialization, 23510.2.3.1 Integrating the Silicon–Germanium Chip into IBM’s Production Process, 23510.2.3.2 Finding New Markets, 23610.2.3.3 Creating New Strategies, 237References, 239PART IV HYBRID MATERIALS AND NEW FORMS OF MATTER: LIQUID CRYSTALS AND NANOMATERIALS 24311 Product-Oriented Materials I: Liquid Crystals and Small LC Displays—the Electronic Calculator and the Digital Watch 24511.1 Background, 24611.2 RCA and Liquid Crystal Research, 24811.2.1 The Liquid Crystal Display: Initiation and Research at RCA, 24811.2.1.1 Richard Williams and His Liquid Crystal “Domains”, 24811.2.1.2 George Heilmeier and His Two Modes of Liquid Crystal Action, 24911.2.1.3 The Search for Room-Temperature Liquid Crystals, 25111.2.1.4 The First Experimental Displays, 25211.2.2 The Liquid Crystal Display: (Attempts at) Development at RCA, 25211.2.2.1 Weakening Influence of the Sarnoff Labs, 25211.2.2.2 Search for a Business Unit, 25311.2.2.3 Loss of the Champion, 25511.3 Small LCD Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization I: US Start-ups Spin-off, 25511.4 Europe and Liquid Crystals, 25911.5 Small LCD Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization II: Japan, 26011.5.1 The Sharp Corporation and the LCD Pocket Calculator, 26111.5.2 The Seiko Corporation and the Digital Watch, 265References, 26812 Product-oriented Materials II: Liquid Crystals, Thin-Film Transistors, and Large LC Displays—Flat-screen Televisions and Personal Computers 27112.1 Background, 27212.2 TFTs: Initiation, Research, and Early Development, 27312.2.1 The United States: Westinghouse and TFTs, 27312.2.2 Europe: New Forms of Silicon and TFTs, 27612.3 Large LCDs: Development, Scale-up, and Commercialization, 27612.3.1 Large LC Display Start-Up and Spin-Off Ventures in the United States, 27712.3.2 Japan Enters into Large LC Displays, 27812.3.2.1 Flat-Panel (Hang-on-the-Wall) TVs, 27812.3.2.2 Computer Displays: Joint US–Japanese Cooperation, 281References, 28413 Nanomaterials: The Promise and the Challenge 28713.1 Background, 28713.1.1 Nanomaterials, 28813.1.2 Nanotubes, 28913.2 Nanotubes: Discovery and Early Research, 29113.2.1 Early Research, 29113.2.1.1 A Question of Space Dust, 29113.2.1.2 Richard Smalley, Clusters, and the “AP2” Machine, 29313.2.1.3 Chance Discovery of a New Form of Matter: C60 and the “Buckyball”, 29513.3 Nanotubes: Later Research and Early Development, 29813.3.1 A Small Buckyball “Factory” in Germany, 29913.3.2 Smalley Reenters the Fray: An Entrepreneurial Vision, 30013.3.3 The Laser Oven Stopgap, 30213.3.4 The “HiPco” Solution: Fluidization and Nanomaterials, 30313.4 Nanotubes: Later Development and Scale-up, 30313.4.1 Technology Transfer: From Rice University to Carbon Nanotechnologies Inc., 30313.4.1.1 CNI and Its Pilot Plant, 30413.4.1.2 SWNTs and Their Problems, 30513.5 Nanotubes—commercialization: The Case of Bayer Materials Science, 308References, 311PART V CONCLUSION 31514 Risks, Champions, and Advanced Materials Innovation 31714.1 The Major Task Milestones in Advanced Materials Creation, 31814.2 “Underground” Versus “Aboveground” Advanced Materials Innovation, 32014.2.1 Underground Versus Aboveground Innovation, Strategic Context, and the Major Task Milestones, 32114.2.2 Underground Versus Aboveground Innovation: Firm and Project Characteristics, 32514.3 Underground Advanced Materials Creation: General Electric and Union Carbide, 32714.4 Aboveground Advanced Materials Creation and the “Gauntlet of Risks”, 33014.4.1 Phase I: Initiation—“Relevancy” Risks, 33714.4.2 Phase II: Early Research—Intellectual Risks, 34714.4.3 Phase III: Late Research—Resource Minimization Risks, 36314.4.4 Phase IV: Early Development—Prototyping Risks, 36414.4.5 Phase V: Late Development—Technology–Market Interaction Risks, 37114.4.6 Phase VI: Scale-Up Phase—Scaling Risks, 38914.4.7 Phase VII: Commercialization Phase—“Cultural-Strategic” Risks, 39014.5 The Structural Context and Advanced Materials Innovation, 41914.6 Inventors and Champions, 42214.6.1 Inventors, Champions, and the Gauntlet of Risks, 42314.7 The Different Types of Advanced Materials Champions, 43314.8 Final Thoughts and Implications, 43814.8.1 Implications for Companies and Investors, 44114.8.2 Implications for Government, 44314.8.3 A Global Perspective, 444References, 446INDEX 449