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The Long Wait examines the history of the United States' dealings with the United Kingdom on nuclear matters in the first dozen years following the Second World War. Chief among the issues analyzed are whether to share nuclear information, know-how, and technology with the British; whether to cooperate in the control and allocation of critical raw and nuclear materials, whether to grant the British any right of consultation on use of American nuclear bombers based in Britain, and on what terms to introduce into Britain American intermediate range nuclear-tipped missiles.
Timothy J. Botti holds a PhD in American Foreign Policy History from Ohio State University, and is a historian and former lecturer/teaching assistant at Ohio State University.
AbbreviationsIntroductionThe Illusion of CooperationProtecting the Atomic MonopolyMovement toward Limited CooperationThe British Want MoreThe United States Agrees to Cooperate--AlmostOut of the QuestionRunning in PlaceWho Shall Be Consulted on the Use of Atomic Bombs?Full Consideration?The Struggle for Control of Atomic Energy PolicyActivity--but No ActionGetting OrganizedFundamental DecisionsAmending the McMahon ActStriving to Achieve a Minor VictoryCooperation on HoldDeceiving the JCAEFirst Catalyst for Nuclear PartnershipEisenhower Takes CommandPolitical ComplicationsSecond Catalyst for Nuclear PartnershipClearing the Final HurdlePartnership at LastConclusionBibliographyIndex
Timothy J. Botti's volume about the shaping of the nuclear partnership in the period 1945-58 is a very valuable contribution to the existing literature on this theme, some of which is now rather dated. . . . Its appearance is timely.