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Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research. The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.
Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Henry R. Luce Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science, Yale University, US
Contents:Introduction and OverviewSusan Rose-AckermanPART I: CORRUPTION AND POOR GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD1. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries? Johann Graf Lambsdorff2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi3. Measuring Institutions Christopher WoodruffPART II: CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE4. Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of InstitutionsRay Fisman and Roberta Gatti5. Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in PoliticsJana Kunicová6. Decentralization, Corruption and Government AccountabilityPranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee7. Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic StructureAjit Mishra8. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis Mushtaq H. KhanPART III: CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM9. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition CountriesAlan Rousso and Franklin Steves10. Corruption in China and Russia Compared: Different Legacies of Central PlanningJens AndvigPART IV: SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS 11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?Jennifer Hunt12. Corruption and the Demand for Regulating CapitalistsRafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch13. Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of Norwegian Firms Tina Søreide14. Laboratory Experiments on CorruptionKlaus Abbink PART V: SECTORAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About ItRitva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson16. Corruption and the Management of Public Works in ItalyMiriam Golden and Lucio Picci17. Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in UgandaOdd-Helge Fjeldstad18. The Economics of Anti-Corruption: Lessons from a Widespread Customs ReformDean Yang19. Prescription for Abuse? Pharmaceutical Selection in Bulgarian HealthcarePatrick Meagher Index
'This book gives a deep understanding of the subject of corruption and could prove a useful means of citing established research by high-ranking professors, in the defence of cross-border corruption trials.'
John C. Coffee, Louis Lowenstein, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Columbia University) Coffee, John C. (Adolf Berle Professor of Law, Adolf Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) Lowenstein, Louis (Henley Professor of Finance and Law, Henley Professor of Finance and Law, Yale University Law School) Rose-Ackerman, Susan (Ely Professor of Law and Political Economy, Ely Professor of Law and Political Economy