Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy

Proceedings of the First International Colloqium on Cognitive Science

Inbunden, Engelska, 1991

AvJ. Ezquerro,Jesús M. Larrazabal,Jesús M Larrazabal

2 029 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt för medlemmar vid köp för minst 249 kr.

Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy brings together theorists from philosophy, linguistics, psychology and artificial intelligence, in order to develop foundations, to present methodological issues and to point the ways to future theoretical research in cognitive science. The interdisciplinary approach of the book is apparent and it seeks to integrate the theoretical paradigms already constructed in the particular fields mentioned above. Its title indicates the central place of semantics as a bridge between cognition and philosophy. The introduction presents the basic content of the papers and points out some of the links between them.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum1991-12-31
Mått155 x 235 x 24 mm
Vikt694 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SeriePhilosophical Studies Series
Antal sidor324
Upplaga1992
FörlagKluwer Academic Publishers
ISBN9780792315384

Tillhör följande kategorier

1: Animal Cognition and Human Cognition: A Necessary Dialogue.- I. Introduction.- II. Characterization of Comparative Cognition.- III. Cognitive Modules and Evolution.- IV. Two Goals of Comparative Research: General Processes and Evolutionary Sequences.- V. Consciousness and Cognition.- VI. Conclusions.- 2: User Modelling in Knowledge-Based Systems.- I. Introduction.- II. Situations of Interactive Communications.- III. The Content of the User Model.- IV. Characteristic Dimensions of a User’s Model.- V. Domain-Knowledge: Shallow Versus Deep Modelling.- VI. Modelling Intentions.- VII. Building a User’s Model.- VIII. Learner’s Model.- IX. Conclusion.- 3: Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.- I. Background.- II. A Justification of Generalized Conditionalisation.- III. The Judy Benjamin Problem.- IV. An Apparent Counterexample to Simple Conditionalisation.- V. The Three Prisoners.- VI. Judy Benjamin Again: The Strong Strategy.- VII. Independence.- 4: On the Representation of Linguistic Information.- I. Introduction.- II. The Modularity Hypothesis.- III. Grammar, Pragmatics and Modularity.- IV. Interdisciplinarity in the Analysis of Linguistic Information.- V. Disjunct Adverbials Pragmatically Oriented Towards the Speaker or Hearer.- VI. On The Representation of Disjunct Constituents: A Multidimentional Approach.- VII. Conclusions.- 5: Modelling Memory for Models.- I. Introduction.- II. Two Senses of “Model”.- III. Models in Working Memory.- IV. Representations for Syllogistic Reasoning.- V. Distributed Bindings and Syllogistic Reasoning.- 6: On The Study of Linguistic Performance.- I. A Proposal for “Cognitive Science” and A Specification of it.- II. Current Situation in Linguistic Performance Theory.- III. Some Issues Regarding Research Programs on Linguistic Performance.- IV. Appendix.- 7: Partiality and Coherence in Concept Combination.- I. Introduction.- II. Flexibility and Specificity.- III. Sense Selection.- IV. Sense Generation.- V. Partiality, Coherence andConcept Combination.- VI. Conclusions.- 8: The Labyrinth of Attitude Reports.- I. Mental States.- II. Semantic Contents.- III. Attitude Reports as Explanations.- IV. The Crimmins-Perry Theory.- V. Reports and Reporting.- VI. Two Kinds of Attitude Reports.- VII. Reporting and Explaining.- 9: Aunty’s Own Argument for the Language of Thought.- I. Introduction: Aunty and the Language of Thought.- II. The Threat of Regress.- III. First Stage: Systematic Cognitive Processes.- IV. First Stage: From System to Syntax.- V. Second Stage: The Structure of Thought.- VI. Second Stage: Concepts and Inference.- VII. Two Objections to the Second Stage.- VIII. Conceptualised Thought and the Connectionist Programme.- IX. An Invitation to Eliminativism?.- 10: Cognitive Science And Semantic Representations.- I. Cognitive and Other Sciences as Using Representations.- II. Natural and Rational Representations.- III. Sources of Variability in Representations.- IV. Use of Prescriptive Rules.- V. Description ofNatural Representations.- VI. Token Representations, Long Term Memory Representations, and the Notion of Activation.- VII. Cross-Compatibility with Neurobiology and Artificial Intelligence.- VIII. Conclusion.- 11: Anchoring Conceptual Content: Scenarios And Perception.- I. Scenarios Introduced.- II. Scenarios: Consequences and Comparisons.- III. A Further Level of Content: An Application.- IV. Spatial Reasoning and Action.