The length, scale and intensity of the Battle of the Atlantic led the British and German navies to make substantial changes to their organisation, strategy and tactics. In this book, Dennis Haslop examines the pivotal lessons learned, and how these helped to determine the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic Convoy War. He questions how well adapted the two organisations were to learn from the conflict, and how effective they were in identifying problems and producing remedies. Based on the in-depth analysis of British and German primary sources, this study provides an innovative basis against which to assess the German and British approach to changing warfare and provides important new insights into aspects of convoy warfare, in particular the virtually unknown subject of German ‘Operational Research’.
Dennis Haslop has a PhD in Maritime History from the University of Exeter, UK.
Introduction1. Elements of German Planning for Convoy Warfare2. Elements of British Planning for Convoy Protection3. New Opportunities for U-boat Bases and Inter-service Rivalry4. The Development of the Western Approaches Command5. U-boat Training to Meet the Requirements of Grey Water Strategy6. Escort Training to Meet the Requirements of Grey Water Strategy7. Learning the Lessons of Training and Procedures: ONS-154 - A Case Study from December 19428. Training to Meet the Requirements of Change9. The Influence of 'OR' on Developments10. The Influence of German 'OR' on U-boat Operations11. The Repulse of the U-boar Atlantic Offensive and Its Consequences12. Return of the U-boat to the North Atlantic and the End Game13. ConclusionAppendix 1 Organization Chart: Kriegsmarine 1938Appendix 2 Organization Chart: Naval War StaffAppendix 3 Lagezimmer Operations and Staff Support FunctionsBibliographyIndex