Blair's Successful War

Andrew M. Dorman is Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King's College London based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK

• Contents: Introduction; Blair and the use of military force; Background history: from the creation of Sierra Leone to the end of civil war; Lomé peace agreement and UNAMSIL - the UN peacekeeping mission; Evacuation, May 2000; Saving UNAMSIL and confronting the RUF; Operation Barras - the hostage rescue; The defeat of the RUF; Impact of the operation; Select bibliography; Index.

'British intervention in Sierra Leone represented an important milestone in shaping the future of Britain’s foreign and security policy and Andrew Dorman’s book provides the first real in-depth study of this event and its longer term consequences. This is an impressive tome that demonstrates how important the humanitarian agenda became for the Blair Government. Equally important, is the rich detail he provides concerning the planning and conduct of the actual military operation, and the problems that arose between the military and their civilian masters. This is a remarkably good study of a military campaign and the wider politics that surrounded it.' Warrren Chin, King's College London, UK 'Blair's Successful War is a critical and compelling account of Britain’s armed intervention in Sierra Leone. This expert assessment is essential reading for those interested in the political, diplomatic and military dimensions of the conflict, and for those examining the doctrine and practice of armed intervention during the Blair government.' Paul Cornish, Chatham House, UK 'During his period in office, Tony Blair deployed British forces on more operations than any other prime minister since the Second World War. The British intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000 was arguably his most successful use of military force. In his insightful book, Dr Andrew Dorman dissects the political and military dynamics behind the Sierra Leone operation, drawing on unprecedented access to the key players in the unfolding operation. The mission to Sierra Leone was important in itself but Dr Dorman shows how, despite its success, the mission anticipated many of the institutional failings which would undermine British efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr Dorman brilliantly illuminates the way in which the lack of clear political guidance from No. 10, inadequate cross-departmental coordination and inter-service rivalry compromised the mission. In the event, Dr Dorman shows how the British