Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity

Inbunden, Engelska, 2002

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Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein's philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.Exposing the myth of "the two Wittgensteins," this book provides a detailed account of the unity in Wittgenstein's thought from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations. Unlike recent interpretations in the literature, this account is not the story of the unfolding of a single view, but instead the story of an ongoing conversation and its internal logic. Throughout his career, Wittgenstein argued that philosophical problems about the necessary and the impossible, on the one hand, and about the meaningful and the nonsensical, on the other, might be dissolved by means of an elucidation of ordinary language use. This approach always relied on the same strategy, namely contextualism. He identified decontextualization as the main source of philosophical confusion and argued that philosophical understanding consists of situating concepts in the normative contexts in which they function. This critical reconstruction contributes to the understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy and illuminates contemporary debates concerning necessity, intelligibility, and the normativity of language.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2002-07-17
Vikt445 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieSUNY series in Philosophy
Antal sidor245
FörlagState University of New York Press
ISBN9780791453872

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Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction 1. Necessity and Intelligibility in the Tractatus 1.1. Possibility and Necessity in the Tractatus1.2. What's Color Got to Do with It?1.3. The Myth of 'Hidden Bodies'1.4. Deflationism and Realism in the Tractatus 2. From Pictures to Yardsticks: The Colorful Transformations of the Tractarian View of Language 2.1. Let the Phenomena Speak for Themselves!2.2. The Emergence of the Satzsystem Conception of Language 3. The Calculus View of Language: Meaning and Rules 3.1. Rules as Constitutive of Meaning3.2. Local Holism, Verificationism, and the Proliferation Problem 3.3. Idealizing Language: The Autonomy of Rules 4. The "Unbridgeable Gulf" between Rule and Application 4.1. Frege on Applicability4.2. The "Internal Relation" between Rule and Application4.3. Is Grammar Up to Me? 5. Internal Relations in Action: Following a Rule versus Conforming with It 5.1. Searching for a Differentia Specifica5.2. The Irrelevance of Learning: Reasons and Causes5.3. From Possible Applications to Actual Uses 6. Normativity in Practice: Learning and Techniques 6.1. Psychologism and "Logical Madness"6.2. Learning and Necessity6.3. Back to the Rough Ground!6.4. The Role of the Community: Contextualism and Quietism in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy Notes References Index