Presentism

Ernâni Magalhães is adjunct professor of philosophy at West Virginia University.L. Nathan Oaklander is David M. French distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan-Flint.

• Part 1 General IntroductionPart 2 Part One. Presentism and Temporal BecomingChapter 3 Introduction. Presentism and Temporal BecomingChapter 4 Chapter One. What is Time?Chapter 5 Chapter Two. The Unreality of TimeChapter 6 Chapter Three. Changes in Events and Changes in ThingsChapter 7 Chapter Four. Is Presentness a Property?Chapter 8 Chapter Five. Presentism: A CritiquePart 9 Part Two. Defining Presentism: The Triviality ObjectionChapter 10 Introduction. Defining Presentism: The Triviality ObjectionChapter 11 Chapter Six. The Presentist's DilemmaChapter 12 Chapter Seven. On Presentism and TrivialityPart 13 Part Three. Overviews of PresentismChapter 14 Introduction. Overviews of PresentismChapter 15 Chapter Eight. Presentism and PropertiesChapter 16 Chapter Nine. A Theory of PresentismChapter 17 Chapter Ten. A Defense of Transient PresentismPart 18 Part Four. The Case Against PresentismChapter 19 Section One. Presentism and Inter-Temporal RelationsChapter 20 Introduction. Presentism and Inter-Temporal RelationsChapter 21 Chapter Eleven. Presentism and the Non-PresentChapter 22 Chapter Twelve. Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time RelationsChapter 23 Section Two. Presentism and RelativityChapter 24 Introduction. Presentism and RelativityChapter 25 Chapter Thirteen. Time and Physical GeometryChapter 26 Chapter Fourteen. A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic SettingChapter 27 Section Three. Presentism and TruthmakingChapter 28 Introduction. Presentism and TruthmakingChapter 29 Chapter Fifteen. Presentism and TruthmakingChapter 30 Chapter Sixteen. Presentism and the Grounding ObjectionPart 31 Part Five. Presentism and PersistanceChapter 32 Introduction. Presentism and PersistenceChapter 33 Chapter Seventeen. Temporary Intrinsics and PresentismChapter 34 Chapter Eighteen. On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities

Much has been written on presentism in the last two decades, but these writings are largely scattered throughout the philosophical journals. This volume collects together both classic and contemporary papers on presentism. It is organized in a dialectically satisfying way such that the reader is guided through both the motivations for adopting presentism and the objections facing it. Each section has a helpful introduction that identifies and clarifies the main issues to be tackled by the following papers, and raises helpful questions to steer the reader through them. There is a good balance between papers that defend and those that criticize presentism. Anyone interested in the philosophy of time, and presentism in particular, will find this a valuable resource.