This book, first published in 1999, examines the influence of precedent on the behavior of US Supreme Court justices throughout the Court's history. Under the assumption that for precedent to be an influence on the behavior of justices it must lead to a result they would not otherwise have reached, the results show that when justices disagree with the establishment of a precedent, they rarely shift from their previously stated views in subsequent cases. In other words, they are hardly ever influenced by precedent. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does exhibit some low level influence on the justices in the least salient of the Court's decisions. The book examines these findings in light of several leading theories of judicial decision making.
List of tables and figures; Preface; 1. Precedent and the Court; 2. Measuring precedential behavior; 3. Precedential behavior from the beginning through the Chase Court; 4. Precedential behavior bridging the 19th and 20th centuries; 5. Precedential behavior in the Hughes, Stone, and Vinson courts; 6. Precedential behavior in the Warren court; 7. Precedential behavior in the Burger Court; 8. Precedential behavior in the Rehnquist court; 9. The Supreme court and state decisions; 10. Conclusions; List of references; Case index; Subject/name index.
"This book by two distinguished political scientists makes a bold claim: Supreme Court justices rarely adhere to precedent, and when they do, it is usually in cases of no great importance. The authors write crystal-clear prose and sustain it with copious and careful research....This landmark book should be read by all serious students of the judicial process." Choice