Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining

Applications in the Politics of Conflict

Häftad, Engelska, 2023

AvWilliam Spaniel

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Over the last quarter century, crisis bargaining has become the prevailing paradigm for the study of war. This textbook presents a concise and approachable overview of the crisis bargaining literature, surveying the canonical formal models in the bargaining approach to war. It begins by considering different explanations for war, then delves into two classes of explanation: commitment problems and incomplete information. This textbook is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduates, and researchers alike. Each chapter delves into a specific part of the puzzle, rigorously unravelling the twisted logic that causes wars to begin. More than seventy illuminating figures illustrate the strategic reasoning outlined and more than 100 exercises of graded levels of difficulty help clarify readers' own understanding of the issues. Online resources include an instructor answer key and numerous engaging video lectures.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2023-11-09
Mått176 x 255 x 20 mm
Vikt699 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor376
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781009318532

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William Spaniel's research focuses on interstate conflict, nuclear weapons, and terrorism. He uses game theoretical models to develop new insights on these phenomenon. He received a PhD in political science from the University of Rochester in 2015. Before arriving at the University of Pittsburgh, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has authored many books, including Bargaining over the Bomb, and coauthored Militant Competition, both published by Cambridge University Press. His YouTube channel covers current affairs in international relations and receives millions of views each month.

1. Introduction: why war? Part I. Complete Information Models: 2. War's inefficiency puzzle; 3. Power and commitment problems; 4. Preventive war and bargaining over power; 5. Hidden commitment problems; Part II. Incomplete Information Models: 6. Uncertainty over costs; 7. Uncertainty over power; 8. Cheap talk and incentives to misrepresent; 9. Military mobilizations and costly signals; 10. Manipulating the peace premium; 11. Mechanism design; 12. Fighting and learning; Part III. Appendices: 13. Discounting; 14. Derivatives of implicit functions; 15. Mechanism design primer.

'Textbook, yes, but at the same time a creative, well organized, and clearly written synthesis and presentation of around 30 years of thinking about paths into armed conflict in terms of bargaining models. Spaniel's book pulls this part of the field together in a highly useful way, adding valuable clarifications and insights throughout. Excellent both as an efficient introduction and a jumping off point for next steps.' James Fearon, Stanford University, California