Debunking Arguments in Ethics

Häftad, Engelska, 2020

Av Hanno Sauer, The Netherlands) Sauer, Hanno (Universiteit Utrecht

529 kr

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In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2020-11-12
Mått151 x 229 x 14 mm
Vikt385 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor255
FörlagCambridge University Press
ISBN9781108438278

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Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Hanno Sauer is an Assistant Professor of Ethics at the Department of Philosophy at Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands and a member of the Ethics Institute. He is the author of Who's Afraid of Instrumental Reason? Instrumentelle Vernunft und die Diagnose sozialer Pathologien (2009) and Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions (2017). Sauer has published articles in a number of journals including Philosophical Studies, The Journal of Ethics, Philosophical Psychology and Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Introduction: debunking arguments and the gap; Part I. Debunking: 1. Debunking explained: structure and typology; 2. Debunking defused: the metaethical turn; 3. Debunking contained: selective and global scope; Part II. Disagreement: 4. Debunking realism: moral disagreement; 5. Debunking conservatism: political disagreement; Part III. Deontology: 6. Debunking details: the perils of trolleyology; 7. Debunking doctrines: double or knobe effect?; Part IV. Conclusion: 8. Vindicating arguments.