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Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility

Inbunden, Engelska, 2022

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Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and Responsibility brings together leading researchers from psychology and philosophy to present new findings and ideas about human agency and moral responsibility. Their contributions reflect the growth of research in these areas over the past decade and highlight both the ways that philosophy can be relevant to empirical research and how empirical work can be relevant to philosophical investigations. Mixing new empirical work with the meta-philosophical and philosophical upshot of the latest research being done, chapters cover motivated cognition and free will beliefs, folk intuitions about manipulation and agency, mental control in assessments of responsibility, the importance of skilled decision making to free will judgments and the relationship between free will and substance dualism.Blending cutting-edge research from philosophy with methods from psychology, this collection is a compelling example of the value of interdisciplinary approaches, contributing to our understanding of the complex networks of attitudes, beliefs, and judgments that inform how we think about agency and responsibility.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2022-04-21
Mått156 x 234 x 22 mm
Vikt500 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
SerieAdvances in Experimental Philosophy
Antal sidor224
FörlagBloomsbury Publishing PLC
ISBN9781350188082

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Introduction, Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston, USA) and Andrew Monroe (Appalachian State University, USA)1. Free Will Belief, Intention Attribution and Judging Responsibility, Oliver Genschow (University of Cologne, Germany) and Marcel Brass (Ghent University, Belgium)2. The Blame Efficiency Hypothesis: An Evolutionary Framework to Resolve Rationalist and Intuitionist Theories of Moral Condemnation, Cory Clark (University of Pennsylvania, USA)3. Mental States and Control-Based Theories of Moral Responsibility, Corey Cusimano (Princeton University, USA) and Geoffrey P Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania, USA)4. The Zygote Argument: An Empirical Investigation, Florian Cova (University of Geneva, Switzerland)5. Moral Responsibility Without (Some Kinds of) Freedom, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University, USA)6. Folk Jurisprudence, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility, Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston, USA) and Andrew Monroe (Appalachian State University, USA)7. Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Experimental Philosophy, Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University, USA)8. Direct and Derivative Moral Responsibility: An Overlooked Distinction in Experimental Philosophy, Pascale Willemsen (University of Zurich, Switzerland)9. Victim Omissions: How Doing Nothing Affects Judgments of Cause and Blame, Laura Nemi (Cornell University, USA) and Paul Henne (Lake Forest College, USA)10. Free Will and Skilled Decision Theory, Adam Feltz, Gwen Hoang, Braden Tanner, Jenna Holt, and Asif Muhammad (University of Oklahoma, USA)Index

What are the conditions under which a person’s will is free and they are responsible for what they do? As the essays in this volume demonstrate, this question cannot be answered exclusively from the armchair or exclusively with the empirical methods of science. Nadelhoffer and Munroe have assembled a set of exciting, transdisciplinary essays that seamlessly synthesize philosophical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. Though experimental philosophy is a relatively young field, the sense that it has come of age and is delivering important new insights about human agency is evident throughout these pages.