Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Name: Wittgenstein's Account of Truth
SKU: 9780791456262
Price: 579 SEK
Availability: InStock
Author: Sara Ellenbogen
ISBN: 9780791456262

Häftad, Engelska, 2003

AvSara Ellenbogen

579 kr

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Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy.Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use," what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2003-01-30
Mått152 x 229 x 13 mm
Vikt254 g
FormatHäftad
SpråkEngelska
SerieSUNY series in Philosophy
Antal sidor164
FörlagState University of New York Press
ISBN9780791456262

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Abbreviations Preface Acknowledgments PART I. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO THE REJECTION OF TRANSCENDENT TRUTH 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism 2. The Positive Account of Truth 3. Antirealism Revisited PART II. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO SEMANTIC ANTIREALISM 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent PART III. WHY A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH? 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? Notes Bibliography Index

"Clearly written and tightly argued, this book throws light on the complexities of Wittgenstein's writings and thereby on the complexities of our concept of truth." — William H. Brenner, author of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations"Wittgenstein's Account of Truth presents a clear, concise summary of the semantic antirealist's position in the debate over the nature of truth in philosophy of language, and how it relates to the later Wittgenstein." — Jonathan Bain, Polytechnic University

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