Inbunden, Engelska, 2015
The Particularistic President
Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality
Av Douglas L. Kriner, Andrew Reeves
1719 kr
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Beskrivning
Produktinformation
- Utgivningsdatum: 2015-06-18
- Mått: 158 x 235 x 19 mm
- Vikt: 470 g
- Format: Inbunden
- Språk: Engelska
- Antal sidor: 248
- Förlag: Cambridge University Press
- ISBN: 9781107038714
- Utmärkelser: Richard E. Neustadt Award, Presidents and Executive Politics Section, American Political Science Association 2016
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Mer information
Douglas L. Kriner is an associate professor of political science at Boston University. He is the author of After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, which received the 2013 D. B. Hardeman Prize from the LBJ Foundation for the best book that focuses on the US Congress from the fields of biography, history, journalism, and political science. He is co-author (with Francis Shen) of The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of American Wartime Inequalities. His work has also appeared in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics, among other outlets. Andrew Reeves is an assistant professor of political science at Washington University, St Louis, and a research fellow at the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy. He previously held a faculty position at Boston University and has held research fellowships at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and at the Center for the Study of American Politics within the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University. His work has appeared in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics, among other outlets.
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'In this well-informed and rigorous work, the authors challenge the view of presidential universalism with their finding that presidents routinely allocate federal resources to benefit their partisan and electoral constituencies. The fact that chief executives skew policy to the demands of the electoral college encourages us to reconsider our views of the presidency and the manner in which we elect its occupants.' George Edwards, University of Oxford
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