Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Mission Analysis for Stability and Support Operations

In June of 2001, the Department of the Army published FM 3-0: Operations. FM 3-0 specifies the principles for conducting Army operations across the spectrum of conflict ranging from military operations other than war to war. Significant to the publication is the recognition that stability and support operations are an integral element of all Army operations and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Numerous stability and support operations conducted throughout the 1990s demonstrated that stability and support operations by nature occur in complex environments. The complexity is both structural and dynamic. The structural complexity is defined by the number of actors with independent objectives and policies, as well as demographic, political, and resource conditions that constrain the environment. The dynamic complexity is defined by the uncertainty of outcome and magnitude as the result of the interactions among the actors in the operating environment. Within such a complex environment, it can be extremely difficult for planners and commanders to identify where within the system of systems to apply effects to achieve desired ends. Complex operational environments are not unique to the military. The fields of politics, sociology and biology all offer examples of both structural and dynamic complex situations. Practitioners in several disciplines have developed problem solving methodologies designed specifically to deal with complexity that are potentially useful to the military problem solver. Of particular potential is the work done in the area of general systems theory and several sub-disciplines to include hard systems, soft systems and operations research methodologies. This monograph explores how existing systems techniques can be directly applied or modified to meet the requirements of mission analysis in stability and support operations. The study evaluates the adequacy of current mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield doctrine