Moral Relativism and Reasons for Acting

Is morality objective, or is it always relative to a set of values? Are there any universal moral requirements? What is the relationship between being rational and being moral? Should we be moral, and if so, why? In Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action , Robert Streiffer addresses these questions, which are at the centre of metaethics. He provides an original and insightful critique of the two main arguments for moral relativism. Against the view that moral relativism is the best explanation of the intractability of moral disagreement, Streiffer argues that, to the contrary, if moral relativism were true, then moral disagreements would, by and large, fade away. His argument is informed by work in philosophy of language and the history of science. Against the view that there are no universal moral requirements, Streiffer criticizes the underlying account of reasons for action and motivation. In its place, Streiffer explores an account of reasons for action based on the ways in which an action can be good. Taking into account recent philosophical work on goodness, this account provides the beginnings of an attractive theory of what our moral requirements are and why we should abide by them.