Value Grounded on Attitudes

Does subjectivism in value theory - the view that value is grounded on
attitudes - imply that when we think and talk about what is good and
bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and
other attitudes? * Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances
are reports or expressions of the speaker"s attitude? * Are subjectivists
committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction
is valuable for its own sake? * Are subjectivists disqualified from
talking about intrinsic value? * Is it a consequence of subjectivism that
if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different
things would be valuable? * Is subjectivism a view on which things can
be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? * Are
subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism?
* Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of
subjectivism? * Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes - Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-
Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections
and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.